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ARTICLE
THE CORE OF COPYRIGHT: AUTHORS, NOT
PUBLISHERS
Wendy J. Gordon
ABSTRACT
Copyright largely consists of alienable rights and correlative
duties—rights of exclusion given to individuals, and correlative
duties not-to-copy imposed on the public. This Article argues that
such right/duty pairs arise out of authorial creation. A focus on
creation is not very popular at the moment; a growing number of
commentators take the position that copyright is “about” making
publishing and other dissemination industries more efficient and
stronger. The Article encourages the legal community instead to
return to the focus that the Supreme Court articulated in Feist
Publications, namely, that copyright must serve creative authorship
rather than noncreative labor.
The Article explores history, legal doctrine, and economics to
investigate whether Congress may, for the purpose of aiding
publishers and other disseminator industries, impose on the public
a set of duties-not-to-copy others’ speech. In Eldred v. Ashcroft and
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Golan v. Holder, the Court upheld expansions of copyright even in
regard to already-created works, relying in part on the possibility
that the legislative expansions might incentivize noncreative
dissemination. In each case, the contested statutes eliminated what
would otherwise have been a public domain status for the works
involved. One argument seemed to be that publishers or
entertainment companies might repair and reissue more of their
stockpiled films, books, or sound recordings, if they owned or could
purchase copyright in them, as compared to how many films, etc.,
the companies would repair and reissue if the works were in the
public domain.
But there are far more old works in circulation than hidden in
basement stockpiles. It may be plausible that statutorily restoring
or extending copyrights might generate some additional
dissemination of affected works. It is far less plausible, however, to
imagine that the increase might ever be large enough to match the
increased dissemination that would have resulted from the public
having liberties to copy those works.
Of even more importance is the issue of relevance: much of the
new provisions’ supposed pro-dissemination impact should have
been legally irrelevant to the Court. The Article contends that
noncreative dissemination provides legitimate grounds for
expanding copyright only when the dissemination assists authorial
creativity. (So, for example, a new copyright provision might
enhance disseminator profit in a manner that also raised the
royalties that authors received. Constitutionally speaking, that
provision’s only relevant benefits should lie in its ability, if any, to
encourage authorial productivity.) An approach that gives more
importance than this to dissemination could lead to the one form of
copyright ruled out by the Framers, namely, a copyright that lasts
forever.
In the economic realm, the Article argues, inter alia, that the
significance of Arrow’s information paradox for the economics of
authorship (as distinguished from its significance in the economics
of inventorship) lies not in encouraging disclosure and
dissemination but in encouraging creation of new work; that much
of the pro-publisher economic argument either boils down to serving
authorship or lacks persuasive power; and that the speechrestrictive powers that copyright confers are far less suitable tools
for aiding disseminators than would be more conventional forms of
Congressional aid.
On the doctrinal and historical side, the Article shows how the
Court in Golan misunderstood the role that “publication” played in
federal law prior to the 1976 Copyright Act; the Article presents a
descriptive account of early common law copyright that offers a
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distinctive explanation for the role of publication in state law; and
the Article examines the language of the Constitutional clause that
empowers Congress to grant federal copyright in the first place. The
Article also offers a new explanation of the so-called “distribution
right” that empowers copyright owners to sue anyone who
unknowingly sells unauthorized copies. All these phenomena are
shown to support the view that creativity constitutes the core of
federal copyright. Finally, the Article asks whether its creativitycentered viewpoint can be maintained without contradicting the
doctrine (which I have long supported) that some acts of noncreative
copying and dissemination legitimately deserve shelter under the
“fair use” doctrine.
—WJ Gordon, with thanks to Michael Zimmer.
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INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY

The Constitution empowered Congress to give authors
exclusive rights to further “Progress.”1 It was hoped that copyright
would encourage authors to employ their intellectual and aesthetic
faculties—not to mention their time—in creating new works. The
instant Article contends that when copyright provisions are
challenged on constitutional grounds, courts should look to the
effect of those provisions on authors’ productivity, and courts should
not employ, as a justification for copyright provisions, any
encouragement the contested provisions might offer to noncreative
dissemination standing alone.2
1.
The Constitution provides that “The Congress shall have Power To . . . promote
the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and
Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.” U.S. CONST.
art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (emphasis added).
2.
The Federalist Papers sought to persuade the public to adopt the newly
proposed Constitution. The following is the Federalist Papers’ entire argument on behalf
of the copyright power. Although no one source can be conclusive, it is interesting that
this language shows no trace of concern for publishing per se:
The fourth class [of powers that the proposed Constitution would grant to
the new federal legislature] comprises the following miscellaneous powers: 1. A
power “to promote the progress of science and useful arts, by securing, for a
limited time, to authors and inventors, the exclusive right to their respective
writings and discoveries.”
The utility of this power will scarcely be questioned. The copyright of authors
has been solemnly adjudged, in Great Britain, to be a right of common law. The right
to useful inventions seems with equal reason to belong to the inventors. The public
good fully coincides in both cases with the claims of individuals. The States cannot
separately make effectual provisions for either of the cases, and most of them have
anticipated the decision of this point, by laws passed at the instance of Congress.
THE FEDERALIST NO. 43, at 268 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961), available at
http://www.constitution.org/fed/federa43.htm.
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An exclusive right under copyright is a particular kind of legal
tool. One person’s exclusive right over reproduction creates in
everyone else who might want to creatively reproduce portions of
that speech a prima facie duty to obtain permission first.3 That is,
every grant of an “exclusive” right over speech creates duties in the
public not to speak. That right and its correlative duties are not to
be imposed lightly. I argue that under our constitutional scheme,
Congress can give private individuals a power to restrain others’
speech4 only when that incentive is linked to encouraging the
creation of new authorial works.5 In other words, if Congress wants
Whether Madison was right in his assessment that authors had copyright under
British common law has been much debated. For a review of the scholarship, and a
conclusion that gives some support to Madison’s interpretation, see H. Tomás GómezArostegui, Copyright at Common Law in 1774, 47 CONN. L. REV. 1 (2014).
3.
Duties and rights are correlatives: Where an enforceable right exists, it exists
against someone, and that someone is a duty holder. Walter W. Cook, Hohfeld’s
Contributions to the Science of Law, 28 YALE L.J. 721, 724 (1919). So when copyright law
speaks of granting rights, it simultaneously and necessarily imposes duties.
Hohfeld’s classification of legal relations among private parties is a canonical
source for such analysis. Hohfeld meant by the category he termed “right” an ability to
call on government to assist. Because most of the relations he discusses have been called
“rights” at some time or another, it is common today to call this particular category a
“claim right.”
The conceptual structure Hohfeld introduced is straightforward. When one lacks
freedom to act (because someone else has a claim right), the constrained person has a
“duty.” When one has a liberty to act, but no entitlement to call on the government for
assistance, that person has a “liberty” (Hohfeld called it a “privilege”). Definitionally,
where liberty governs, private persons have neither “duties” nor enforceable “claim
rights” against each other. Id. For example, when someone strikes back at an assailant
under the “privilege” of self-defense, she violates no duty, and the injured assailant has no
valid “claim right” against her, so long as her self-defense actions remain within the
privilege. Rights and duties are correlatives, in the sense that where one of them appears,
so does the other. Liberty and no-rights are correlatives, too. Id. at 725.
A duty can be asserted not only against a private party but also against a
sovereign. Thus, freedom from governmental interference (“liberties”) can be backed by
“claim rights.” Notably, the Bill of Rights created many “claim rights” in the liberties it
awarded, and the principle of judicial review requires courts (that is, the courts have a
“duty”) to strike down legislation inconsistent with the Constitutional liberties. See infra
notes 72–82.
4.
Many commentators argue that courts should explicitly use the First
Amendment to limit the legal duties not-to-copy that copyright imposes on the public;
usually the idea/expression dichotomy and the fair use doctrine are seen as the primary
modes through which free speech interests emerge in copyright. See infra notes 72–82. On
the connections between private censorship and duration issues, see, e.g., Wendy J.
Gordon, Do We Have a Right to Speak with Another’s Language? Eldred and the Duration
of Copyright, in COPYRIGHT AND HUMAN RIGHTS 109–29 (Paul L.C. Torremans ed., Kluwer
Publishing 2004).
5.
The instant Article examines the scope of federal copyright’s goals in regard to
only one question: whether publishers have any claim to copyright’s legitimate solicitude
beyond the extent to which helping the publishers also helps authors. In this Article I do
not reach other important questions, such as whether authors and audiences have claims
in morality or natural right that federal copyright law should recognize. See, e.g.,
Universal Declaration of Human Rights art. 27, G.A. Res. 217A (III), U.N. Doc. A/810
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to foster other socially beneficial activities, those other activities
must be encouraged by other means.6
It might be asked, why do I bother advancing this contention
now? Hasn’t the Supreme Court essentially rejected it both in
Eldred v. Ashcroft7 and in Golan v. Holder?8 Those opinions upheld
the constitutionality of copyright expansions with arguments that
relied on the challenged provisions’ providing advantages to
noncreative activities like dissemination and physically restoring
decayed movie stock.9
My contention still matters for at least two reasons. First, the
Court’s language hasn’t fully cut off its line of retreat, and retreat
(Dec. 10, 1948) (addressing in paragraph one the rights of the public to participate, share,
and benefit in culture and science, and in paragraph two the rights of authors). For
discussion indicating how I think the law should handle some of the areas where author
and audience moral claims might intersect, see Wendy J. Gordon, A Property Right in
Self-Expression: Equality and Individualism in the Natural Law of Intellectual Property,
102 YALE L.J. 1533 (1993) (arguing that the Lockean proviso guarantees extensive
liberties of use to the public); Wendy J. Gordon, Toward a Jurisprudence of Benefits: The
Norms of Copyright and the Problem of Private Censorship, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 1009 (1990)
(highlighting symmetry between author and audience moral claims).
6.
For a fascinating analysis that highlights the need to shape justificatory
arguments to copyright’s role in restraining speech, see Seana Shiffrin, Lockean
Arguments for Private Intellectual Property, in NEW ESSAYS IN THE LEGAL AND POLITICAL
THEORY OF PROPERTY 141 (Stephen R. Munzer ed., 2001).
7.
Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 218–22 (2003).
8.
Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873, 890–91 (2012).
9. Id. at 890–91; Eldred, 537 U.S. at 206–08, 220. The Court’s apparent logic rests on
the assumptions (1) that exclusive rights will generate more profits than will the public
domain’s nonexclusive liberties to publish; and (2) that with the lure of these greater profits,
old works will be reissued more often than if the works had entered the public domain.
While the first assumption is plausible, the second is not.
The Golan Court’s analysis seems to imagine a movie company that owns
copyright in a long unseen film (its copyright ownership having been attained either by
assignment of copyright or by the company having employed the creative people who
made the movie). The movie company decides that saving and reissuing the old film will
generate enough profit to warrant the effort only during the pendency of copyright and
decides it will not reissue the movie if the copyright expires. What the imagined story
omits is, inter alia, the likelihood that if the movie falls into the public domain, others will
polish up the aging film stock and reissue the movie. See, e.g., Public Domain Movies,
YOUTUBE, https://www.youtube.com/user/BestPDMovies (last visited Nov. 10, 2014).
Admittedly, a movie company may have unique physical control of some old
films. But access to them can be purchased. Some public volunteers (such as the American
Film Institute) have not-insubstantial budgets. See About the American Film Institute,
AM. FILM INST., http://www.afi.com/about/whatis.aspx (last visited Nov. 10, 2014)
(American Film institute archive). Thus, as various scholars have noted, it is plausible
that if the movie company did not reissue the movie, public volunteers with or without
profit motive would do so. That is one of the things the public domain is for.
This Article is, however, not concerned with the resolving the factual debate
over whether a greater increase in dissemination would result from extending copyright
term or from limiting copyright term. Rather, I argue that dissemination concerns should
be incapable of supporting a copyright provision against constitutional attack except to
the extent that the dissemination helps incentivize authorship.
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may be particularly necessary now; Congress might be pushed to
enact ever-more-outrageous copyright statutes now that creativity
has been decentered.
Second, our absurdly complex copyright statute needs an
overhaul; policymakers might make good use of a gyroscope with
some clear direction and simplicity. The common law is an excellent
source from which to derive relevant insights: it draws policies from
commonsense economics10 and commonsense morality11 in
characteristic patterns that most lawyers can understand and
deploy. These policy strains, and, in particular, their instantiation
in tort and restitution case law, might provide helpful alignment for
a copyright gyroscope.
Comparing our actual copyright law with the pattern that the
common law might have generated12 can highlight where our
current statute may need special justification or need rethinking.
And here is the crux, which leads to the instant Article: the common
law logic works well only if creating an original work of
authorship—not dissemination—is the touchstone.
My analyses of the implications that tort and restitution hold
for copyright appear elsewhere;13 few of those details appear here.
Rather, this Article seeks to assess the obstacle that Golan puts in
the way of doing a sensible common law analysis. Most common law
causes of action begin with a volitional act. Golan raises doubts
about whether the crucial volitional act for copyright is, or is not,
authorial creation.
This Article evaluates Golan for the purpose of clearing
the ground, as it were, in preparation for building the
gyroscope.

10.
See generally RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (2010).
11.
See, e.g., SHELLY KAGAN, NORMATIVE ETHICS 77 & passim (1998) (proposing
that common-sense morality is a mixture of consequentialism and deontology).
12. For my initial attempt at such an experiment, see Wendy J. Gordon, On Owning
Information: Intellectual Property and the Restitutionary Impulse, 78 VA. L. REV. 149 (1992)
(arguing that the common law of restitution could have generated something like copyright,
had legislation not been enacted to serve the relevant need, and setting out the elements of
such a cause of action).
13. See generally Wendy J. Gordon, The Concept of “Harm” in Copyright, in
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE COMMON LAW 452 (Shyamkrishna Balganesh ed., 2013);
Wendy J. Gordon, Copyright as Tort Law’s Mirror Image: “Harms,” “Benefits,” and the Uses and
Limits of Analogy, 34 MCGEORGE L. REV. 533 (2003); Wendy J. Gordon, Harmless Use: Gleaning
from Fields of Copyrighted Works, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 2411 (2009) (with introduction by Sonia
Katyal); Wendy J Gordon, Trespass-Copyright Parallels and the Harm-Benefit Distinction, 122
HARV. L. REV. F. 62 (2009). Restitution has a baseline rule that refuses to give volunteer creators
of benefits any right to recover payment. For a discussion of how copyright would fare under
that rule, see Wendy J. Gordon, Of Harms and Benefits: Torts, Restitution, and Intellectual
Property, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 449, 449–82 (1992). See also Gordon, On Owning Information,
supra note 12, at 149.
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A brief side note: because the Golan opinion made questionable
use of the historical artifact known as “common law copyright,” this
Article also gives it attention.14 But that is not the common law I
have in mind as a reference-point for the needed gyroscope. In the
United States, the only uncontroversial “common law copyright”
historically was an entitlement given only to unpublished works;
the right was notionally perpetual so long as the work remained
unpublished.15 If this was the common law guide I was looking for, I
14.
See discussion infra Part V, especially at Part V.D.
15.
Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591, 668 (1834). In that case, the U.S.
Supreme Court held that there was no common law copyright in published works, and
that upon publication an author had to obtain federal protection. Federal protection
attached if the author “complied with the requisites prescribed by . . . act of congress.” Id.
The Court contrasted authors’ pre- and post-publication positions:
That an author, at common law, has a property in his manuscript, and may
obtain redress against any one who deprives him of it, or by improperly
obtaining a copy endeavours to realise a profit by its publication, cannot be
doubted; but this is a very different right from that which asserts a perpetual
and exclusive property in the future publication of the work, after the author
shall have published it to the world.
Id. at 657.
The distinction between published and unpublished works lost most of its legal
significance when the 1976 Copyright Act came into effect. That statute, which with its
many amendments still governs, provides that federal copyright is exclusive for all “fixed”
works (that is, works that are written down or otherwise recorded), whether published or
unpublished. 17 U.S.C. § 301 (2012).
This Article does not enter the quagmired debate over issues such as whether a
common law right in published works of authorship originally existed in Britain but was
extinguished by statute, or whether a common law right over published works never
existed at all. In the United States, our Supreme Court seems to have wavered a bit in its
construal of early law, and itself over time changed the law of anticopying obligations
arising under common law.
In 1834, the Supreme Court stated that common law rights in published works
never existed. Wheaton, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) at 661 (“That congress, in passing the [copyright]
act of 1790, did not legislate in reference to existing rights, appears clear . . . Congress,
then, by this act, instead of sanctioning an existing right, as contended for, created it.”).
Yet in the famous, or infamous 1918 case of International News Service v. Associated
Press, the Supreme Court itself created/recognized a common law right (pre-Erie) against
what it called the “misappropriation” of published news. Int’l News Serv. v. Associated
Press, 248 U.S. 215, 240–41 (1918).
In addition, prior to the time that federal law gave musicians copyrights in their
recorded performances, California and New York (and possibly other states) prohibited the
unauthorized copying of disseminated sound recordings. The Supreme Court upheld one such
law against a preemption challenge. Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546 (1973). Although the
case addressed a state criminal statute that prohibited copying, there is nothing in the logic
that suggests the Court would give different treatment to a judge-made rule. Id.; see also Ferris
v. Frohman, 223 U.S. 424, 435 (1912) (declaring and enforcing, for physically undistributed
plays, a common law right of representation that was immune to divestment by public
performance). On the evolution of the play right, I am much indebted to Jessica Litman, The
Invention of the Common Law Play Right, 25 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1381, 1385–86 (2010).
In short, common law precedent has changed greatly over the years. Today one of
the forces holding it back is the statutory preemptive effects of the copyright and patent
statutes.
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would have been disappointed. This right of first publication is so
deeply rooted in the physical control of the manuscript, and in
addressing the relations between the author and particular persons,
that some scholars would not call it “copyright” at all.16
Historic common law copyright had rationales quite different
from those underlying statutory copyright. Common law copyright
functioned, I believe, largely as an adjunct to ordinary property
rights in a manuscript, and as a prophylactic to reduce undesirable
behavior by owners, their associates, and strangers17 that might
otherwise arise around the physical control of unpublished works.18
When the new Copyright Act came into effect in 1978, it eliminated virtually all
state copyright in written or otherwise recorded works. 17 U.S.C. § 301. One of the rare
exceptions, incidentally, is for pre-1972 sound recordings; their state rights are safe from
preemption until the year 2067. Id. § 301(c).
What is important for our purposes is that, within the last decade, the Supreme
Court argumentation in Golan made strategic use of the fact that during much of
America’s history, the dividing line between state and federal protection was often
“publication.” My discussion below argues that the Court misunderstood the nature and
purpose of that dividing line. See infra Part V.
16.
Ronan Deazley views the common law right of first publication as a physical
property right and, as such, distinct from “copyright.” Ronan Deazley, Capitol Records v.
Naxos of America (2005): Just Another Footnote in the History of Copyright?, 53 J.
COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 23, 41–43 (2005). Although I agree that the common law right
centered on the physical manuscript, the right of first publication that attached to the
manuscript differed from the rights attached to ordinary physical chattels; in my view the
differences were large enough that I believe the eighteenth century right of first
publication deserves the “copyright” label.
I do not think anything for instant purposes turns on the terminological difference
between us; Professor Deazley and I agree on the essential point, that unlike current copyright,
historical common law copyright focused on the author’s physical control.
17.
Ownership of an object containing valuable secret information can give rise to
undesirably extensive self-help by its owner; trade secrecy law and common law copyright
both minimize wasteful defensive measures by buttressing less than perfect defenses.
Similarly, a valuable manuscript may prompt strangers to engage in undesirable hard-toprove acts (such as bribery or trespass) by persons wanting access to the secret. A law
that prohibits copying the secret information or the manuscript discourages these
unlawful acts. See David D. Friedman, William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Some
Economics of Trade Secret Law, J. ECON., Winter 1991, at 61, 61–64, 69.
18.
See supra note 15 and accompanying text; see also Wendy J. Gordon, An Inquiry
into the Merits of Copyright: The Challenges of Consistency, Consent, and Encouragement
Theory, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1343, 1453–54 (1989).
What I present here does not purport to offer a diagnosis of the full range of
historical phenomena linked with common law copyright, even within the United States. Many
distinct American doctrines have arguably hidden under the single label of common law
copyright, and, conversely, some doctrines that deserve the “common law copyright” label pass
under various other rubrics. Common law jurisdictions outside the United States have
wrinkles of their own. I address only the aspects most relevant to the Golan position on
dissemination.
Nevertheless the reader might find the following droplet of interest: The only
time the U.S. Supreme Court evaluated a state common law right in unfixed performance,
it ruled state protection acceptable because the plaintiff sought not to stop the defendant’s
activity but only to be paid. Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard, 433 U.S. 562, 576–78 (1977)
(performance by “human cannonball” was filmed and broadcast without his authorization;
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That copyright in unpublished works was thought “perpetual” can
be explained by the close link that existed between undisseminated
works and control of a physical manuscript copy. The importance of
controlling the perpetually-owned physical object led, I think, to a
parasitical rule that the copyright in the manuscript should also be
perpetual so long as physical control was maintained by lack of
publication.19
If, as I argue further below, historical common law copyright in
unpublished works served as an adjunct to physical control,20 it
more resembled trade secret law21—a cause of action granted
largely to prevent innovators from overinvesting in self-help,22 to
discourage outsiders from violating existing contractual, relational,
or real property rights, and perhaps, but not only to, preserve
incentives—than it did a property right in an intangible.23 As such,
historical common law copyright is less relevant to formulating
copyright policy today than are the policies of economics and moral
judgment found in general patterns of tort and restitution law. As
will appear, the historical artifact known as “common law copyright
in unpublished works” therefore has a limited role in this Article: to
help us assess whether the Golan opinion overstated or misstated
the role that “publication” played in that doctrine.24
the performer’s common law right, labeled “right of publicity,” was upheld against a First
Amendment challenge). As I argue in the text accompanying infra note 69, copyright is
most problematic when it is enforced through injunction.
19.
Similarly, trade secret protection lasts only so long as the “owner” maintains
protection for the secrecy. When the owner allows his or her physical fences to come down,
so do his or her trade secret rights.
20.
See discussion infra Parts IV.D, V.A–D.
21.
Of course, I am hardly the first person to see parallels between common law
copyright and trade secrecy. See, e.g., Note, Necessity of Intent for Infringement of
Common-Law Copyright, 54 YALE L.J. 697, 699 n.5 (1945).
22. This view of trade secrecy as a means to prevent a self-help arms race (“Is my new
wall higher than your new ladder?”) was probably first introduced by Friedman, Landes &
Posner, supra note 17, at 61, 61–64, 69. The Arrow information paradox, discussed infra Part
IV.D, indicates another linked reason for trade secrecy law: without legal protection, insecure
inventors might be too fearful to find investors and collaborators.
Alternative views of trade secrecy—as a mode of incentivizing innovation, as
found in Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., or as a mode of enforcing commercial morality—
have some merit as well. Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 482, 491 (1973).
23.
The pattern of words, colors, sounds or symbols that make up a “work of
authorship” can be memorized and later duplicated and performed without the copyist
ever touching the original embodiment of the work. (This was a linchpin in the plot of Ray
Bradbury’s famous novel Fahrenheit 451: in a book-burning society, the rebels saved
literature from being lost for all time by memorizing books.)
The ability to use the work without touching it leads to the work of authorship being
called an “intangible.” The work itself is the intangible pattern; by way of contrast, a copy is the
tangible embodiment of the pattern. See generally Wendy J. Gordon, Intellectual Property, in
THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF LEGAL STUDIES 617, 617–46 (Peter Cane & Mark Tushnet eds.,
2003), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=413001.
24.
See infra note 158 and accompanying text.
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Returning to the main argument:
Under the Constitution, Congress can grant a copyright (and
impose its correlative duties) only for “limited Times.”25 Common
law economic and moral logic does indeed lead to duties that stop
short well before perpetuity,26 but that is true only so long as a
particular act, such as creating a work of authorship, is put at the
core. The view that noncreative dissemination standing alone can
justify imposing on the public a duty not to copy would by contrast
lead to a permanent duty not to copy, surviving eons after the
person whose efforts gave birth to the duty is gone.27
If the rights for a work begin once, those rights will be limited
in duration by the common law logic that we see in, for example,
proximate cause. Proximate cause limits a plaintiff’s rights where
intervening events, time, distance, or coincidence results in an
injury being caused in an unforeseeable manner. Negligence law
does not bother to impose liability for results that are unforeseeable
largely because liability cannot encourage people to avert dangers
that they do not perceive.28 For proximate cause to be a meaningful
concept, there must be an action from which to evaluate the effects
caused. And because “limited Times” is a central feature of federal
copyright, the rights attached to a creative work must have
reference to a nonrecurring action.29 Given copyright’s history, that
nonrecurring behavior must be an act of creating a work.
For any particular version30 of any particular expressive
pattern, creation can happen only once; by contrast, dissemination
of the same version can continually recur. If the rights can be
25.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
26.
See infra Part III.
27. Perpetual land ownership is often traced back to some ancestral act of occupation,
and it may be wondered why copyright should be treated differently. For example, Nozickian
fans of historical justification do not see much problem with allowing ownership to be
legitimized by long-ago acts. See ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 174 (1974).
But they are focusing on land and other tangibles, which may need “an owner” to be managed
well; if “an owner” is needed (a question of course much debated), historical chains of title
provide as good a source as many. Unlike tangibles, however, works of authorship need not be
owned by any one person or entity to be used efficiently and well; often common ownership
(“public domain” status) is the most productive status. Nozick himself seems to support term
limits on patents. See id. at 228–30.
28.
I am simplifying a bit. For example, although foreseeability is usually
measured from a “reasonable man” perspective, tort case law often imposes on persons
with “extra” knowledge a duty to avoid carelessness with regard to the dangers that they
(and not the reasonable man) might see.
29.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
30.
A work need not be of fully independent origin to be copyrightable. As is
recognized in the law of “derivative works,” a new version that copies and adapts prior
works can be sufficiently creative to deserve a separate copyright of its own. Of course,
the derivative work copyright does not give the person doing the reworking any rights
over the material copied. 17 U.S.C. § 103(b) (2012).
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restarted whenever a category of disseminator requires incentives,
copyright could last forever.
Moreover, our cultural and business life has become
endangered by a marked expansion in rights against copying. Over
the past forty years there has emerged a remarkable tendency by
courts in various areas of IP31 to give plaintiffs enforceable rights
over the benefits they generate and to demonize free riding by
defendants.32 Part of the problem arises from the nature of
litigation:
Most applicable norms caution against the unrestrained
impulse to reward creators for the benefits they
generate. . . . Unfortunately, these other norms are difficult to
articulate, whereas “reaping and sowing” comes neatly to the
tongue. Further, litigation contains a structural bias against
the articulation of a community interest in free access, for the
community as such cannot be a litigant. Against an articulate
plaintiff who is enunciating what sounds like a moral interest
in reaping what she has sown often stands a commercially
motivated defendant who may be an unsympathetic figure
poorly situated to communicate what the community has at
stake. Spokespersons for the community interest in
nonownership exist, but, given the likely structure of the
relevant litigation, their voices may go unheard.33
Yet the legislative branch, too, seems to have joined the
misappropriation bandwagon. The legislative provisions ratified by
Eldred and Golan are part of the “misappropriation explosion” that
so threatens us; “the interdependence upon which our cultural life
rests is on the verge of becoming a cash-and-carry operation.”34
The Founders did not authorize anticompetitive, property-like
shelters for all activity that generates social benefits. To the
contrary, they reserved narrowly cabined rights for a subcategory of

31.
See, e.g., Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, Grounding Trademark Law
Through Trademark Use, 92 IOWA L. REV. 1669, 1670–71 (2007); Mark A. Lemley,
Property, Intellectual Property, and Free Riding, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1031 (2005).
32. To “free ride” is to benefit from another’s effort without doing harm. A change is
“Pareto superior” when it helps at least one person without harming anyone else. See, e.g.,
Richard A. Markovits, The Causes and Policy Significance of Pareto Resource Misallocation: A
Checklist for Micro-Economic Policy Analysis, 28 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1975). “Free riding” is thus
an activity that the principle of pareto-superiority would recommend, at least if one assumes
that the lack of short-term harm also leads to no long-term shortfalls. John Locke assumed
that only the “the quarrelsome and contentious” would object to others reaping gains that
caused no harm, at least as long as everyone had a sufficiency of resources. JOHN LOCKE, THE
SECOND TREATISE OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT, ch. V, § 34 (1690).
33.
Gordon, On Owning Information, supra note 12, at 278–79; see also id. at 149
passim (describing the misappropriation explosion).
34.
Id. at 277.
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activities, namely, work that involved the life of the mind.35
Returning copyright to its pre-Eldred, traditional focus on creativity
might prove a useful part of the effort to curb the promiscuous
spread of intellectual property liability.
II. BACKGROUND: PRIVATE EARTHQUAKES
In 1998, the U.S. Congress extended the nation’s already long
copyright term.36 The term already ran for life of the author plus
fifty years; it was extended by another twenty years.37 Challengers
to the statutory extension brought lawsuits claiming it was
unconstitutional. In support of such a challenge, seventeen noted
economists, including five Nobel laureates, signed a brief submitted
to the Supreme Court. In this nearly unprecedented document, the
economists jointly stated that the then-recent extension of copyright
term in the United States could not appreciably increase incentives
to authors.38
By implication, the economists’ brief backed the common
wisdom: that when the American Congress extended copyright from
life of the author plus fifty years to life-plus-seventy, the goal was
35.
Justice Breyer’s dissent in Golan analogously argued that many activities can
assist the Progress of knowledge, but the Constitutional Clause includes only some of
those activities within its compass. In distinguishing creative activities from others,
Justice Breyer focused not on the intellectual faculty that produces creative work (which
is my immediate focus), but rather on economic structure. Works of authorship are goods
that have a high initial cost (to “produce” the initial manuscript) but whose marginal cost
(to “produce” an extra copy) can be remarkably low. He wrote:
The industry experts [on whom the majority relies] might mean that temporary
extra profits will lead them to invest in the development of a market, say, by
advertising. But this kind of argument, which can be made by distributers [sic]
of all sorts of goods, ranging from kiwi fruit to Swedish furniture, has little if
anything to do with the nonrepeatable costs of initial creation, which is the
special concern of copyright protection.
Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873, 909–10 (2012) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
The general point is of course a good one, but Justice Breyer might be
misunderstood as suggesting that “nonrepeatable costs of initial creation” is a sufficient
basis for copyright. To the contrary, such a cost pattern may be necessary to justify
copyright, but could not be sufficient to do so. Noncreative activities, such as the
databases covered by the Feist ruling, can also have “nonrepeatable costs of initial”
production, yet they are properly denied copyright protection. Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural
Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 364 (1990). The Framers decided that something more—
namely, a link to the life of the mind—is necessary.
36.
I adapted some of the material that follows from an earlier short article, Wendy
J. Gordon, Dissemination Must Serve Authors: How the U.S. Supreme Court Erred, 10 REV.
ECON. RES. ON COPYRIGHT ISSUES, no. 1, 2013, at 1., available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=2305535. I am grateful to that Review and its editors, especially
Richard Watt.
37. Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act, Pub. L. No. 105-298, 112 Stat. 2827
(1998).
38.
Brief of George A. Akerlof et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 2,
Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003) (No. 01-618), 2002 WL 1041846, at app. 1.
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not to encourage new authorship; rather, the industry actors who
stood to benefit were primarily companies which profit by exclusive
control over the dissemination of authorial works created long ago,
such as the copyrighted cartoon character “Mickey Mouse.” The
statute in question, formally known as the Copyright Term
Extension Act (CTEA), was jokingly referred to as the Mickey
Mouse Protection Act. Mickey was “saved” from the public domain
by the enactment of copyright term extension, and the owner of
Mickey’s copyright, Disney, had been very active in lobbying for the
extension.39
A majority opinion of the Supreme Court nevertheless
upheld the CTEA.40 In doing so, the Court exhibited some
unease with the economists’ brief. The majority opinion
deflected the impact of the brief by relegating it to irrelevance:
the Court indicated that whether or not the challenged
copyright extension aided authorial incentives, the extension
might be valid if it encouraged noncreative behavior that helps
knowledge and the arts to progress.41 For an example, the Court
cited the way that term extension might encourage some
companies to take old films out of mothballs and physically
restore the film stock.42

39.
Disney Lobbying for Copyright Extension No Mickey Mouse Effort: Congress OKs
Bill Granting Creators 20 More Years, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 17, 1998, § 1, at 22.
40.
Eldred, 537 U.S. at 222.
41.
Federal power to enact copyright legislation is granted by U.S. CONST. art. I,
§ 8, cl. 8, sometimes known as the Copyright and Patent Clause or the Intellectual
Property Clause. Set out at note 1 supra, it provides, “The Congress shall have Power
To . . . promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to
Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.”
For further parsing of the clause, see infra note 107 and accompanying text.
42.
Eldred, 537 U.S. at 206–07. In the cited passage, the majority opinion states
that Congress had “rationally credited projections that longer terms would encourage
copyright holders to invest in the restoration and public distribution of their works.” Id. at
207 (citing, inter alia, H.R. REP. NO. 105-452, at 4 (1998)).
Note the Court’s telling misuse of language. When speaking of creative works,
possessive pronouns like “their” usually indicate authorial source, not copyright
ownership. (As in, “The poets still felt connected to their poems.”) By contrast, copyright
assignees are usually said to own “copyrights” not “works.” Thus, in the primary source
the Court used for the just-quoted statement, namely H.R. REP. NO. 105-452, the phrase
“their works” appears only in relation to authors. H.R. REP. NO. 105-452, at 4 (“Authors
will be able to pass along to their children and grandchildren the financial benefits of
their works.”). The Court turns usual usage on its head when it speaks of nonauthors
doing something with “their” works. All the nonauthors have is “their” copyrights.
It’s as if the writer of the majority opinion views copyright ownership as bearing the
most significant possible relationship to a work. In that rhetoric centered on ownership, being
the person who created the work might mean little; being someone deeply influenced by the
work (consider the locution, “they’re playing our song”) would mean even less.
But I admit, this is mere speculation; in analyzing how people use language,
even Freud sometimes slipped.
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This step in reasoning registered 6.5 on my personal Richter
scale.
Only a few years earlier, in the famous Feist case, the same
Court had decided that copyright could not extend to noncreative
compilations.43 In Feist, the Court had held that only creative works
were within legitimate range of congressional concern under the
Constitution’s Copyright Clause.44 Regardless of how greatly a
potential database industry might need copyright protection to
incentivize investment in data collection and regardless of how
valuable such data might be to social progress, copyright could not
inhere in noncreative works.45 Now, a bare eleven years later, the
Court was saying that even though Feist was rightly decided,
Congress could use noncreative activity to justify rules about how
creative works were handled.46
These two cases presented questions that weren’t technically
identical—Feist dealt with works that were noncreative in their
inception, while Eldred dealt with works that were creative in their
inception.47 Nevertheless, the holding of Feist seemed to me then,
and seems to me now, to focus on authorial incentives in a manner
totally opposed to Eldred’s approach.
What was the result of the Eldred Court upholding the
extension of copyright in already-created works for another twenty
years? People who wanted to copy and adapt works published in
1923 and thereafter—who stood ready to post digital versions of
those works via websites like Project Gutenberg, or to build new
creative works out of the old materials as they attained public
domain status—were burdened with a twenty-year obligation they
would not otherwise have had.48 This was also bad news for efforts
like Google Books and the HathiTrust Digital Library (a universityconsortium project), which seek to allow people to search entire
libraries.49 In order for the public to search via Internet, the books
43.
Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 359–60 (1991)
(“[O]riginality, not ‘sweat of the brow,’ is the touchstone of copyright protection in
directories and other fact-based works.”).
44.
Id. at 363 (holding that Rural’s telephone directory was not copyrightable
because the “age-old practice” of alphabetical arrangement “does not possess the minimal
creative spark required by the Copyright Act and the Constitution”).
45.
The Court’s language extended to all noncreative databases; the creation of the
actual database at issue—a white pages phone book—had no such need for copyright
incentives. Id. at 363–64.
46.
Eldred, 537 U.S. at 206–08 (explaining that encouraging noncreative
“restoration and . . . distribution” was a valid purpose of the CTEA).
47.
I am indebted to Jane Ginsburg for pressing me on this point.
48. See PROJECT GUTENBURG, http://www.gutenberg.org/ (last visited Nov. 19, 2014).
49.
See GOOGLE BOOKS, http://www.books.google.com/ (last visited Nov. 19, 2014);
HATHI TRUST DIGITAL LIBRARY, http://www.hathitrust.org/ (last visited Nov. 19, 2014).
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needed to be digitized: after term extension, thousands of additional
old, about-to-be available books needed permissions—or the risky
shelter of fair use—to be lawfully digitized.50 Since many of these
(dubbed “orphan works”) had copyright owners who could no longer
be identified or located, it required a risk-tolerant or courageous
actor to dare make copies of them. The situations of both Google51
and HathiTrust52 have been temporarily ameliorated by judgments
of fair use, but both the Google and HathiTrust suits lie within the
Second Circuit. Less sensitive judicial approaches than the Second
Circuit’s exist.53 And for many other people and institutions who
want to use and post old works, but cannot afford either permission
or litigation, Eldred reinforced a barrier that fair use won’t
surmount.
In the Eldred opinion’s upholding of an extension of copyright
term,54 the Court discussed film stock restoration and other
noncreative disseminative activities in a way that disturbingly
hinted that such activities could justify a statute enacted pursuant
to the Copyright Clause; but at least the discussion left a bit of
doubt whether such activities standing alone could suffice.55 I
therefore still had some hope that the Court did not really mean
that a copyright statute that prevented the public from freely using
and disseminating old works could be upheld simply because it
assisted noncreative activity.56 More recently, the spindly support
on which that hope rests became even more fragile.

50. For example, the New York Public Library’s efforts to digitize a donated collection of
over twelve thousand items relating to the New York World’s Fair of 1939 and 1940 were
burdened by a “time-consuming and, ultimately, fruitless” effort to locate extant rights holders.
Letter from Ann Thornton, Andrew W. Mellon Dir., N.Y. Pub. Libraries, to Karyn Temple
Claggett, Assoc. Register of Copyrights, U.S. Copyright Office (Mar. 6, 2013), available at
http://www.copyright.gov/orphan/comments/noi_11302012/New-York-Public-Library.pdf. The
Library had the courage to digitize the material nevertheless.
51.
Authors Guild, Inc. v. Google, Inc., 721 F.3d 132 (2d Cir. 2013).
52.
Authors Guild, Inc. v. HathiTrust, 755 F.3d 87, 105 (2d Cir. 2014), aff’g 902 F.
Supp. 2d 445 (S.D.N.Y. 2012).
53.
See, e.g., Princeton Univ. Press v. Mich. Document Servs., 99 F.3d 1381, 1391–
92 (6th Cir. 1996) (finding that the university copy shop’s preparation and sale of
“coursepacks” without payment of royalties to the publishers that held copyright in the
duplicated material was not fair use and thus violated copyright law).
54.
Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 208, 222 (2003).
55.
Id. at 239–40.
56.
In Eldred, the question in part involved whether noncreative activity could
be a legitimate goal of congressional solicitude under the IP Clause of the
Constitution. The Court hedged. In part of the opinion, the majority seemed to
indicate that such activity could so serve; in others, the majority seemed to hesitate,
as if noncreative activity could be relevant only as a partial justification. Compare id.
at 206–07 (stating that Congress had a legitimate purpose in encouraging
restoration), with id. at 227 (emphasizing the “overriding purpose of providing a
reward for authors’ creative activity”).
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In Golan v. Holder, decided in 2012, the Court addressed the
question of whether Congress exceeded its power when it enacted a
remarkable U.S. statute that gave U.S. copyright to some foreign
works that had been in the U.S. public domain.57 The statute was
remarkable in part because prior case law took as a virtual article of
faith that “matter once in the public domain must remain in the
public domain.”58
The restoration statute, creating or reviving U.S. copyrights in
works already created, was challenged on the ground, inter alia,
that “federal legislation cannot serve the Clause’s aim unless the
legislation ‘spur[s] the creation of . . . new works.’”59 The challenge
failed.60
In upholding the statute, the Supreme Court majority wrote,
over a strong dissent, that “[t]he provision of incentives for the
creation of new works is surely an essential means to advance the
spread of knowledge and learning. We hold, however, that it is not
the sole means Congress may use ‘[t]o promote the Progress of
Science.’”61
“Inducing
dissemination”
could
also
justify
Congressional action.62 While the opinion’s language leaves room to
57. Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873, 878, 881–83 (2012) (in upholding 17 U.S.C. § 104A
(2012), the Court ruled that “[n]either the Copyright and Patent Clause nor the First
Amendment . . . makes the public domain . . . a territory that works may never exit”). Section
104A had been adopted to further U.S. compliance with the Berne Convention, and its
implementation in the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights
(TRIPS). See U.S. COPYRIGHT OFF., http://www.copyright.gov/circs/circ38b.pdf (last visited Nov.
24, 2014).
Under the Berne Convention, member nations cannot condition copyright
ownership on compliance with formalities; yet under earlier U.S. law, many works
over the years had entered the public domain because of a failure to comply with
then-required U.S. formalities, such as placing a prescribed form of copyright notice
on all published copies of a work. Section 104A allowed restoration of copyright in
some of the non-U.S. works that had lost copyright in this way. See 17 U.S.C. § 104A.
58.
See Kewanee Oil Co. v Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 484 (1974).
59.
Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 888 (citing Brief for Petitioners at 24, Golan, 132 S. Ct. 873
(No. 10-545)).
60.
Id. at 878; see also supra note 57.
61. Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 889 (emphasis added). In addition to what I argue is a
substantive error, note the institutional solecism of the language. Courts do not ordinary “hold”
what a legislative purpose is, or “hold” any other particular rationale. Rather courts “hold” that
given particular facts, a particular result should follow, e.g., that a piece of legislation is or is
not valid.
In the common law system, at least practiced in the United States, consistency
of results is more important than consistency of rationale. Therefore, the U.S. Supreme
Court is less bound by this purported “holding” than may appear.
62.
Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 888 (“Nothing in the text of the Copyright Clause confines
the ‘Progress of Science’ exclusively to ‘incentives for creation.’ (quoting Shira Perlmutter,
Participation in the International Copyright System as a Means to Promote the Progress of
Science and Useful Arts, 36 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 323, 324 n.5 (2002)) Evidence from the
founding, moreover, suggests that inducing dissemination—as opposed to creation—was
viewed as an appropriate means to promote science.”).
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quibble,63 it seems that the Court believes that in carrying out the
constitutional mandate to “promote the Progress of Science and
useful Arts,” Congress can legitimately enact provisions extending
copyright’s reach even if the statute’s intention and effect would be
to aid only noncreative disseminators.64
The ground beneath me was rumbling; my personal Richter
reading went up a point. The Framers’ special favor for the life of
the mind was being turned into a mode of requiring readers and
other users to pay the publishing industries a subsidy, as if nothing
but money hung in the balance. This was (ahem) wrong.
63.
It is not fully clear that the Court meant to hold that a copyright statute could
be valid if it contributed nothing to inducing creativity. For example, in speaking of the
statute upheld in Golan, the Court states that “[a] well-functioning international
copyright system would likely encourage the dissemination of existing and future works.”
Id. at 889. The reference to “future” works may indicate the Court believed that the
statute would encourage new creative works by increasing their prospect of dissemination
and thus their prospect of financial reward. On the other hand, the sentence just quoted
did not directly address support for inducing future works—only support for their
increased “dissemination.”
Similarly ambiguous is the Court’s comment, already quoted in text, that, “[t]he
provision of incentives for the creation of new works is surely an essential means to advance
the spread of knowledge and learning.” Id. The word “essential” in legal contexts usually
means “indispensable” or “necessary,” which are the word’s core meanings. Saying that
inducing creativity is “essential” to a copyright statute therefore suggests that a copyright
provision, which is void of any potential for inducing creativity, would be invalid.
However, in casual conversation the word “essential” can mean merely
“important.” That lesser meaning seems to be all the Court meant by the word.
First, the Court’s comment about “essential” is followed by a “holding” that
providing incentives for new work creation “is not the sole means Congress may use ‘[t]o
promote the Progress of Science.’” Id.
Second, if the Court had meant that inducing creativity was “essential” in the sense
of “indispensable,” it is hard to know what the Court accomplished by insisting that
noncreative dissemination can be a legitimating purpose under the Copyright Clause. After all,
if some effect on inducing creativity is indispensable, then, in any case where it could be shown
that a particular copyright statute had even a small effect on inducing creativity, such a
statute would presumably be valid––at least under nonstrict scrutiny—without any weight
contributed by dissemination. So to take the Court’s language about “essentiality” seriously
could make pointless its insistence on counting dissemination as a legitimate purpose.
We might, however, speculate on ways to square that insistence with the core
meaning of “essential.” For example, conceivably the Court is thinking ahead to a time
when stricter scrutiny would be used to examine copyright statutes. In such a setting, a
tiny effect on inducing creativity might be insufficient for a statute to pass constitutional
muster; in that situation, Golan might provide precedent for using noncreative
dissemination to strengthen a doubtful copyright statute’s claim to legitimacy.
But speculation is speculation. The Court’s imprecision allows it room to back
out, but it is probable the majority meant that the link to creativity was merely
“important”—and dispensable if incentives to noncreative cultural activity were present.
Taking all this together, I think the Golan opinion is fairly read as indicating
that, in the Court’s view, a copyright statute that did not induce creative activity could be
valid if it encouraged noncreative restoration and dissemination of already-made work.
64.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. Regarding the verbal union of “Science and useful
Arts,” see infra note 107 and accompanying text (explaining my reading of the Copyright
Clause).
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Admittedly, I lack the kind of conclusive evidence that would
convince an originalist that the Court erred: the historians have
reached no consensus on what constraints—other than “limited
Times”—the Framers intended the Clause to impose on Congress’s
copyright power.65 Nor do I have a fleshed-out, nonoriginalist theory
of constitutional interpretation to present today. Nevertheless, the
logic of “limited Times” itself, coupled with the internal logic of the
cause of action known as copyright infringement, lead me to believe
that at the core of copyright lies creativity.
A legislative provision that encouraged noncreative
disseminative activities, like film restoration, printing, or making
physical connections among computers, might help knowledge to
advance, and might be desirable if the provision gave a direct
monetary subsidy, set up an archive, or provided similar assistance.
But it would jar our traditions (and my common sense) if legislation
were to expand copyright for such purposes.
Admittedly, in order for noncreative disseminators to benefit
from copyright expansion, they would need to have employed
creative people in a work-for-hire context, to hold assignments or
licenses from authors, or to be acting as authors’ compensated
agents.66 Perhaps authorial activity is encouraged by such
employment, agency, assignment, or licensing. If so, the statute
might be justified. But any such justification should lie vel non with
the authorial encouragement, not with serving the disseminators’
own needs. Should the disseminators’ noncreative activities fail to
generate predictable revenues capable of encouraging new creative
work, the disseminative activities should not be supported by
copyright.
Also contributing to my sense that copyright should not serve
disseminators (except on those admittedly frequent occasions when
the dissemination in turn serves authorial incentives) is the lack of
“fit” between dissemination and copyright’s key features. The most
obvious lack of fit relates to the constitutional constraint of “limited
Times.” Stand-alone dissemination activities like publishing may
continually need copyright in order to stay in business and “induce
65. See, e.g., Paul J. Heald & Suzanna Sherry, Implied Limits on the Legislative Power:
The Intellectual Property Clause as an Absolute Constraint on Congress, 2000 U. ILL. L. REV.
1119, 1148–49 (“There is no record of any debate over the Intellectual Property Clause at the
Constitutional Convention.”); Oren Bracha, Owning Ideas: A History of Anglo-American
Intellectual Property 273–74 (June 2005) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard Law
School) (“There was hardly any real reported debate or deliberation regarding the intellectual
property clause. It was adopted in the constitutional convention without opposition or debate,
and attracted almost no attention or reference during the ratification stage.”), available at
http://www.utexas.edu/law/faculty/obracha/dissertation/.
66.
See Wendy J. Gordon, Authors, Publishers, and Public Goods: Trading Gold for
Dross, 36 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 159, 171–72, 191–92 (2003).
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progress,” and any such recurring need could lead directly to
perpetual copyright. Only protection linked to a single act—like
production of a creative work—is logically linked to the time
limitation.
I will say more about “limited Times” below.67 Before turning to
that discussion, note another feature of copyright: its remedies.
Destruction of infringing works has been part of a U.S.
copyright owner’s remedies since the beginning,68 and today the
statute combines powers of destruction with other injunctive
remedies69 whose strength is only partly tempered by the eBay
decision.70 As a result of all this, federal law empowers copyright
owners to stop others from speaking when those others mix their
speech with borrowed expression.71
Vitally important speech has been muzzled by copyright
claims.72 Particularly infamous is the injunction that stopped Alan
67.
See infra notes 92–105 and accompanying text.
68.
The power to destroy infringing speech appears in the Copyright Act of 1790.
Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, 1 Stat. 124, 124.
69.
17 U.S.C. § 502 (2012). Also consider the “take down” provisions of the DMCA.
Id. § 512.
70.
See eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 396–97 (2006) (cautioning
against the automatic imposition of injunctions in patent cases).
71.
See 17 U.S.C. §§ 502–506; Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, 1 Stat. at 124.
72. When we raise our voice in ordinary conversations, we usually are at “liberty” to do
so, in the sense that our companions have “no right” to call the cops to make us quiet down (as
long as our decibel level is reasonable) or force us to give someone else a chance to talk. The
other folks present have a “liberty” to shout us down or ignore us should they want to do so,
and we have “no right” against them. That is, we can’t sue for the annoyance or require the
police to bring us microphones.
Our speech-related relations with the government are different. Should a
governmental body not like the content of what we are saying, the Constitution’s First
Amendment puts a “duty” on the government not force me to be silent. Against the government,
therefore, I have not only a “liberty” to speak, but also a “claim right” against governmental
attempts at suppression. Usually one exercises the claim right by seeking judicial intervention.
If the legislature has enacted a statute or other provision that purports to impose censorship, we
seek judicial redress to invalidate the unconstitutional provision; if the police arrest us for
voicing protests, in circumstances where we haven’t done anything that “threatens public
safety,” then after the fact we might bring lawsuits under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“Civil Action for
Deprivation of Rights”).
In sum, we usually (1) have no “claim rights” against each other’s speech, even if our
neighbors’ speech drowns us out, and we usually (2) do have “claim rights” against
governmental suppression of our speech. Copyright imposes a hybrid into the free-speech mix.
Sometimes our speech involves copying speech authored by others. When I quote a
columnist to refute her contentions, or when a parodist repeats portions of a song to poke fun
at it, copying is involved. Whoever owns copyright in the quoted material has a rebuttable
“claim right” to make us stop copying. Against a quotation in print or embedded in a recording,
the copyright owner has exclusive rights of reproduction (17 U.S.C. § 106(1)) and distribution
(§ 106(3)); against an oral quotation in a public speech or musical performance, the copyright
owner has exclusive rights of public performance (§ 106(4)). In addition, the copyright owner
has exclusive rights over variations that others might make on her work. See 17 U.S.C.
§ 106(2), the exclusive right to “prepare derivative works.”
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Cranston from publishing an unexpurgated English translation of
Adolf Hitler’s Mein Kampf, a translation that could have given
America an early warning of Hitler’s true intentions.73
Most commentators probably believe that the Constitution,74
the first Copyright Act,75 and the First Amendment76 were adopted
closely enough in time that we should take the Act and the First
Amendment as consistent.77 By straining my inner eye, I can
perhaps glimpse an arguable consistency: authorship is an ongoing
process that contributes to democratic education and democratic
dialogue, providing a degree of independence to individual
speakers,78 and protection for their expressive integrity, in ways
that conceivably make copyright owners’ powers to destroy and
enjoin other’s speech worth the cost.
But as I said, that concession results from straining my vision;
as copyright expands beyond its 1790 restraints, it becomes
increasingly difficult to accept as appropriate the dangers to free
speech that inhere in copyright grants to authors.79 It is harder still
to see an appropriate “fit” between, on the one hand, expanding
injunctively-enforced rights to exclude and, on the other, a putative
goal of encouraging noncreative activities such as dissemination.80
Admittedly, contrary arguments could be made. The Supreme
Court in Harper & Row called copyright an “engine of free
We might be able to undo such presumptive claim rights with a showing of “fair
use” or other limitation on the copyright, and thus restore our liberty. “Fair use,” a
judicial doctrine now recognized by statute, 17 U.S.C. § 107, supposedly embeds First
Amendment protections.
Unfortunately, under fair use case law, it’s not clear whether or not an
appropriately strong “claim right” to free speech has found a home in copyright. Although
the Constitution’s First Amendment purportedly grants us a “claim right” against
government action that suppresses speech, that right tends to be much harder to use
against copyright owners who employ the government to silence us, than it is to use our
First Amendment claim-right against government suppression that originates with the
government itself.
73.
William Patry, Neil Netanel’s Copyright’s Paradox, PATRY COPYRIGHT BLOG
(Mar. 30, 2008, 8:43 PM), http://williampatry.blogspot.com/2008_03_01_archive.html; see
also NEIL WEINSTOCK NETANEL, COPYRIGHT’S PARADOX 14 (2008) (discussing the issue of
Alan Cranston’s Mein Kampf translation and infringement).
74. The Constitution, ratified in 1788, empowers Congress to grant “exclusive rights,”
but does not specify what remedies should accompany the rights. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
75.
The power to destroy infringing copies appears in the Copyright Act of 1790. Act
of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, 1 Stat. at 124.
76.
The First Amendment was adopted in 1791. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
77.
See Neil Weinstock Netanel, Locating Copyright Within the First Amendment
Skein, 54 STAN. L. REV. 1, 3–4, 7–8 (2001) (exploring whether First Amendment values
are protected by the statutory limitations on copyright).
78.
See, e.g., Neil Weinstock Netanel, Copyright and a Democratic Civil Society, 106
YALE L.J. 283, 339–40 (1996).
79.
See the panoply of remedies at 17 U.S.C. §§ 501–506 (2012).
80.
For an analogous argument, see Shiffrin, supra note 6, at 141.
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expression,” and further referred to copyright as providing
“economic incentive to create and disseminate ideas.”81 And it is
undeniable that democracy is helped not only by new ideas but also
by the spread of existing ones.82
But a multitude of activities and resources could also abet the
spread of ideas and the ability to engage in debate—subsidizing
universities or an Internet, for example. The Founders did not
embrace all of them in copyright.83
After mentioning dissemination in the same breath as
creativity, the Harper & Row Court then wisely went on to
return to baseline: “[T]he talents of authors.”84 This latter
focus on authorial incentive is far more well-entrenched in our
history than is solicitude for commercial disseminators.85
The Constitution and our initial and successive copyright
statutes speak in terms of protecting authors.86 A relevant
number of the Federalist Papers similarly focused on the
reasonable “claims of individual[]” “authors and inventors,” not
disseminators.87 Even the British Statute of Anne, which was
probably enacted at the urging of disseminator interests (the
Stationers’ Company), gives rights to authors.88 Further, the
81.
Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 558, 589 (1984)
(emphasis added).
82.
See Netanel, supra note 78, at 362.
83. For example, at one point the Founders considered, then rejected, giving Congress
the power to fund federal universities. KERRY L. MORGAN, THE CONSTITUTION AND FEDERAL
JURISDICTION IN AMERICAN EDUCATION 5 (2006), available at http://www.lonang.com/
foundation/5/f5E1c.htm.
84.
Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 558 (quoting Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219
(1954)).
85. Remember that the “limited Times” provision focuses on preserving the benefits of
even noncommercial dissemination. The freedom for ideas (17 U.S.C. § 102(b)) similarly
harnesses “volunteers” to spread concepts that authors generate, free of copyright restraints.
86.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
87.
THE FEDERALIST NO. 43, supra note 2, at 268.
88. Craig Joyce, Prologue, The Statute of Anne: Yesterday and Today, 47 HOUS. L. REV.
779, 783 (2010). Note, however, that if the author had already contracted with a bookseller, the
Statute of Anne gave the right to the latter; also, assignees received protection:
That from and after the tenth day of April One thousand seven hundred and
ten the Author of any Book or books already printed who hath not transferred to any
other the copy or copies of such Book or Books share or shares thereof or the
Bookseller or Booksellers printer or printers or other person or persons who hath or
have purchased or acquired the copy or copies of any Book or Books in order to print or
reprint the same shall have the sole right and liberty of printing such Book and Books
for the term of One and twenty years to commence from the said tenth day of April
and no longer. And that the Author of any Book or Books already composed and not
printed and published or that shall hereafter be composed and his assignee or
assignees shall have the sole liberty of printing and reprinting such Book and Books
for the term of fourteen years to commence from the day of the first publishing the
same, and no longer.
Statute of Anne, 1710, 8 Anne, c. 19, § 2.
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implication in the Supreme Court’s opinion in Golan, that
dissemination standing alone can justify copyright expansion,
is a sharp departure from centuries of understanding.89 It is
the traditional understanding—that copyright is for
“authors”—to which I adhere.
In this view I am hardly alone,90 but hardly unopposed.91
In this Article I will investigate some possible explanations for
why the Supreme Court and some of my scholarly colleagues
might have stumbled into what I see as an error, and some of
the reasons why I think their interpretation erroneous.

89.
Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873, 889 (2012).
90. See, e.g., Michael H. Davis, Extending Copyright and the Constitution: “Have I stayed
too Long?”, 52 FLA. L. REV. 989, 999–1000 (2000) (arguing that “[t]here does not seem to be any
constitutional power premised, however, on publication, as opposed to creation, of works nor
upon quality of works”); Heald & Sherry, supra note 65, at 1170 (stating that the “exclusive
right [of copyright should] be granted only as the purchase price for a new invention or
writing”); L. Ray Patterson, Eldred v. Reno: An Example of the Law of Unintended
Consequences, 8 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 223, 234 (2001) (stating there is “no language in the
Copyright Clause that empowers Congress to grant a copyright for the preservation of works.
Indeed, it has been understood from the beginning of statutory copyright that the creation of a
new work is the unalterable condition for copyright”); Edward C. Walterscheid, The
Preambular Argument: The Dubious Premise of Eldred v. Ashcroft, 44 IDEA J.L. & TECH. 331,
374 (2004) (stating, “the [Copyright] Clause was intended to provide an incentive for advances
in science and the useful arts through encouragement of the intellectual efforts of writers and
inventors”).
91. See, e.g., Jonathan M. Barnett, Copyright Without Creators, 9 REV. L. & ECON. 389,
390, 406 (2013) (arguing that “[c]opyright is best conceived . . . as a system for incentivizing
investment by the intermediaries responsible for undertaking the capital-intensive tasks
required to deliver a creative work from an individual artist to a mass audience” (footnote
omitted)); Julie E. Cohen, Copyright as Property in the Post-Industrial Economy: A Research
Agenda, 2011 WIS. L. REV. 141, 143 (stating “the purpose of copyright is to enable the provision
of capital and organization so that creative work may be exploited”); Orrin G. Hatch & Thomas
R. Lee, “To Promote the Progress of Science”: The Copyright Clause and Congress’s Power to
Extend Copyrights, 16 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 11 (2002) (relying on Malla Pollock to claim that
“Progress” in the Copyright Clause of the Constitution must refer to dissemination to avoid
redundancy in the document’s text). See, e.g., Julie E. Cohen, Creativity and Culture in
Copyright Theory, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1151, 1195 (2007) (concluding that a good copyright
system must take into account goals other than encouraging creators, such as the “[c]ontrol of
copying, manipulation, and derivation” exercised by disseminators, which “enables the
organization of entire sectors of economic activity in ways that produce a variety of concrete
benefits, ranging from jobs and exports to an independent expressive sector to cultural
‘solidarity goods’”); Malla Pollack, What Is Congress Supposed to Promote? Defining “Progress”
in Article I, Section 8, Clause 8 of the United States Constitution, or Introducing the Progress
Clause, 80 NEB. L. REV. 754, 804, 809 (2001) (arguing that term “Progress” in the Copyright
Clause refers not to the “Enlightenment Idea of Progress” as “quality improvement over time”
but rather to “Progress” as the spreading of ideas). The progenitor of this stance is probably
Edmund Kitch, who argued that patent law can be best understood not as a mode of
incentivizing new inventive effort, but rather as a means of organizing exploitation—much as
granting a prospector ownership in a gold mine does not cause gold to exist in the earth, but
encourages coordinated extraction and processing of the metal. See Edmund W. Kitch, The
Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20 J.L. & ECON. 265, 266, 285–86 (1977).
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III. “LIMITED TIMES” AND THE NATURE OF A TORT
The Supreme Court has, at least for now, twice rejected
the interpretation of the Clause that I offer. So why do I
pursue the matter? There’s no need to beat two dead horses.
Now that Eldred and Golan are decided, it is hard to see what
practical impact my general author-centric view of copyright
might have. So why do I offer my view of copyright’s core?
As mentioned above, my first reason for proceeding is to
supply stimulus for reexamination should the Court ever
return to the questions of durational or other forms of
copyright expansion. There is room in both Eldred and Golan
for the Court to backtrack in its constitutional interpretation.92
Second, I offer my view of the Clause because the overly
complex statutory scheme we call “copyright” needs some kind
of stabilizing central focus. As discussed earlier, one such
stabilizing vision can be provided by utilizing analogies from
the common law.93 Those analogies make sense only if the core
act of copyright is creating new works.
Abraham Drassinower has suggested that we need a view
of copyright that is “interior” to the copyright infringement
cause of action. He emphasizes a notion of corrective justice
that connects copyright owner with putative infringer.94 While
I do not subscribe to Drassinower’s particular concept of
copyright’s interior structure, his impulse to find an interior
logic is a good one.
Copyright has criminal law and administrative law
aspects, but its central mechanism is the infringement suit.
Infringement is a tort.95 And I believe our understanding of
that tort can be profitably informed by common law tradition.
So we might ask, what logic animates the structure of the
92.
See supra Part I.
93.
In other works I have begun the project of spelling out what common law
approaches might yield. See, e.g., Gordon, On Owning Information, supra note 12, at
156–57, 165–68, 222–23 (discussing forces behind the “common law trend toward
granting new intellectual property rights” (footnote omitted)) and exploring what the
common law of restitution might teach about the appropriate scope of right and
limits; Gordon, Copyright As Tort Law’s Mirror Image, supra note 13, at 533, 539–40
(comparing the common law of personal injury torts and copyright). At this juncture,
however, I am interested only in specifying the starting point from which a common
law logic might proceed.
94.
See ABRAHAM DRASSINOWER, WHAT’S WRONG WITH COPYING? (forthcoming
2015); Abraham Drassinower, A Rights-Based View of the Idea/Expression Dichotomy
in Copyright Law, 16 CAN. J.L. & JURISPRUDENCE 3, 5, 18–19 (2003).
95.
See, e.g., Davis v. Blige, 505 F.3d 90, 103 n.11 (2d Cir. 2007) (“Infringement
has long been recognized as a tort.” (citing Ted Browne Music Co. v. Fowler, 290 F.
751, 754 (2d Cir. 1923))).
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copyright tort suit? How are the correlative roles of plaintiff
and defendant linked?
In my view, what animates the tort duty is the creation of
something beneficial and creative by the plaintiff, and what
violates it is the unfair utilization of some of those benefits by
the defendant.96
All torts involve a violation of duties, and it is the creation
of the beneficial creative work that starts a potential copyright
duty running.97 Viewed from that perspective, most of
copyright’s primary features make sense, particularly the
primary features laid out in the Copyright Clause: that rights
are owned by the authors, and that the rights last for only
“limited Times.”98
The link to authorial right is obvious under my theory: the
creative benefactor is the author, so any cause of action for use of
the benefits created should initially inhere in the author. How this
relates to “limited Times” may, however, need a bit of explanation.
It will be helpful to use an analogy: consider the negligence
rule that requires injured plaintiffs to prove “proximate cause.”99
96.
A growing body of commentary recognizes that copyright has long been
misdescribed as a “strict liability tort.” The strict liability label relates only to one
aspect of the cause of action, namely, that ignorance does not excuse substantial
copying. In other respects, however, copyright is a fault-based regime—particularly
in its requirement that plaintiff prove “substantial similarity” and in the availability
of the “fair use defense.” See, e.g., Shyamkrishna Balganesh, The Normativity of
Copying in Copyright Law, 62 DUKE L.J. 203, 215, 271–74 (2012) (“[T]he fair-use
determination—at least as codified today—makes use of factors and variables that
are legitimately examined as part of the substantial-similarity determination.”);
Shyamkrishna Balganesh, The Obligatory Structure of Copyright Law: Unbundling
the Wrong of Copying, 125 HARV . L. REV. 1664, 1682–83 (2012) (“Strict liability is
ordinarily thought to be either conduct-based or harm-based, depending on the law’s
choice of triggering event for liability. Copying, however, sits somewhat oddly in this
scheme. . . . Its structure of wrongdoing is best described as one of result-throughconduct.” (footnote omitted)); Gordon, Trespass-Copyright Parallels and the HarmBenefit Distinction, supra note 13, at 62–65, 68–69 (discussing the “substantially
similar” inquiry and “fair use defense”); Steven Hetcher, The Immorality of Strict
Liability in Copyright, 17 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 1, 1, 5–7, 14 (2013)
(challenging the conception that copyright infringement is a strict liability tort).
To call copyright a tort of “unfair use” is my way to briefly summarize this
perspective.
97.
I here present a simplified and normative picture. Speaking descriptively,
some caveats are in order. Notably, in federal copyright law, what begins the
copyright is creation plus fixation (physically recording the work by writing,
audiotaping, filming, or other means). 17 U.S.C. § 102 (2012). Prior to fixation, in the
United States creators must look primarily to state law for rights against copying,
and the states vary in the protections offered.
98.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
99.
I have sketched elsewhere the many ways in which copyright operates like
the mirror image of negligence law. Mirrors provide images that are identical but
reversed. See, e.g., Wendy J. Gordon, Copyright and Tort as Mirror Images: On Not
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In negligence law, intervening causes accumulate to cut off tort
actions when the link between cause and effect ceases being
proximate.100 Causing an unforeseeable harm is not “proximate”
causation, not only because it seems unfair to hold someone
liable for what he could not foresee, but also because imposing
liability in such cases would not affect behavior. People may
know that carelessness causes injury, but they will not know how
to avoid acting dangerously in regard to dangers of which they
are ignorant. Thus, a finding of no proximate cause in ordinary
tort cases is often based on a judicial perception that making the
defendant pay will not diminish injuries of the sort that
occurred.101 Analogously, in copyright, the author’s rights cease
as the effects of the beneficial creative act disperse over time.102
As the promise of recompense for those distant effects ceases to
have incentive power, the promise ceases to serve the public’s
interest in new works of authorship.
Mistaking for the Right Hand What the Left Hand Is Doing, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK
ON COMPARATIVE L AW AND E CONOMICS (Giovanni B. Ramello & Theodore Eisenberg
eds., forthcoming 2014) (manuscript at 5–6), available at http://www.bu.edu/law/
events/wipip/documents/MirrorTort.pdf; Gordon, supra note 23, at 622–23; Gordon,
Copyright as Tort Law’s Mirror Image, supra note 13, at 536.
To illustrate the mirror-like similarity and its reversals:
 Both negligence and copyright take incentives seriously. Whereas
negligence law focuses its incentive effect on defendants, copyright
focuses its incentive effect on plaintiffs. Gordon, Copyright as Tort
Law’s Mirror Image, supra note 13, at 535–36.
 Both negligence and copyright take waste and its converse
seriously. Whereas negligence law seeks to discourage wasteful
behavior (carelessness), copyright law seeks to encourage productive
behavior (creativity). Id.
 Both negligence and copyright tend to impose duties where
incentives converge with nonconsequentialist notions of fault. Whereas
various deontological moral theories view most negligent defendants as
deserving to pay for harm done, most such moral theories would also
view most acts of authorship as deserving to receive reward for benefit
generated. Id. at 535.
 Both negligence and copyright value causation. Whereas negligence
law asks “would the harm have occurred but for the defendant’s action”
(the requirement that plaintiffs prove “cause in fact”), copyright asks
“would the defendant have been able to do what he did but for
borrowing from plaintiff’s work” (also a causation requirement, but
known as the rule that most plaintiffs must prove “copying” in fact). Id.
at 536–37.
100.
Gordon, Copyright as Tort Law’s Mirror Image, supra note 13, at 539.
101.
See Shyamkrishna Balganesh, Foreseeability and Copyright Incentives, 122
HARV. L. REV. 1569, 1594–96 (2009).
102.
For other discussions of proximate cause in copyright, see e.g., id. at 1594–
96, 1603–25 (discussing proximate cause and foreseeability in tort and copyright);
Christina Bohannan, Copyright Harm, Foreseeability, and Fair Use, 85 WASH . U. L.
REV. 969, 973–74, 988–91 (2007) (comparing fair use delineation of scope in copyright
liability to proximate cause delineation of scope in tort liability).

Do Not Delete

2014]

11/30/2014 3:21 PM

THE CORE OF COPYRIGHT

639

Thus, ending the copyright term after a number of years is
based on a perception, inter alia, that making a user pay many
years after the creative act will not incentivize benefits of the
sort that the plaintiff created.103 However imaginative or
hopeful an author might be in visualizing future income, as
the date of income receipt moves forward in time, its present
value shrinks; as the prophet’s hyperopic vision moves ever
outward, at some point present value will dwindle sufficiently
to leave even a most optimistic seer monetarily indifferent. 104
This familiar logic works well if the beginning act is the
act of creation. From that act, a cone of effects rays outward;
as the effects spread outward, the cone’s force becomes
attenuated.105 Eventually, the copyright term ends, and the
law stops enabling the author’s heirs or assignees to control
the spread of beneficial effects.
Compare what would ensue if noncreative dissemination
were also a key act. Instead of a cone of light gradually fading
away, we would have a cylinder-shaped laser, one which is
continually boosted as by a relay station and thus never fades:
new actions could continually occur for which reward is
demanded, and copyrights would last forever.
Therefore, to be faithful to the constitutional phrase,
“limited Times,” dissemination should not start the public’s
duty running, or extend the duty’s duration once it has begun
to run. While “limited Times” might have some other, more
strained explication, to root copyright in the creative act
provides the explanation that is most plausible, most linked to
history, and most consistent with modern experience.
IV. DEFINING WHICH INCENTIVES COUNT
A. Language of the Clause: “Science” and “Progress”
First, a minor preliminary matter: you will note as we
proceed that I speak of copyright as furthering the progress of
science and the useful arts. In recent times, the courts have
103.
See, e.g., Gordon, Copyright as Tort Law’s Mirror Image, supra note 13, at
538–39 (“Imposing a duty on a copyist to pay royalties two hundred years after a
book or movie is created will have no impact on an author’s willingness to work hard
today.”).
104.
See Brief of George A. Akerlof et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners,
supra note 38, at 5–6 (giving economic examples of the future value of money).
105.
Various scholars have suggested increasing the scope of fair use, or
decreasing the copyright owner’s scope of rights, as a copyrighted work ages. See,
e.g., Joseph P. Liu, Copyright and Time: A Proposal, 101 M ICH. L. REV . 409 (2002);
see also Justin Hughes, Fair-Use Across Time, 50 UCLA L. R EV . 775, 780 (2003).
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usually linked copyright only with the progress of “Science”
(understood as knowledge).106 That usage, however, overlooks
the Framers’ use of the word “respective,” which by implication
limits the application of parallelism in construing the
Clause.107 As a result, I suggest that both authors and
inventors (as a group) are charged with furthering both science
and the useful arts.
Now we turn to a more important linguistic issue: the role
that the word “Progress” plays in the Clause. Malla Pollack
has argued that the word “Progress” must have some special
meaning108––something
beyond
“improvement
in
the
knowledge base”109––to avoid being surplusage.
106.
See, e.g., Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 187 (2003).
107.
The Copyright Clause is embedded in the Copyright and Patent Clause,
which bears repeating for purposes of examining some of its language:
“The Congress shall have Power . . . To promote the Progress of Science and
useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive
Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
The word “Science” is usually taken as synonymous with knowledge, broadly
conceived. Another potentially problematic word—almost universally ignored—is the
word “respective,” which appears before “Writings and Discoveries.” U.S. CONST. art.
I, § 8, cl. 8.
Conventional interpretation utilizes the logic of parallelism to parse the Clause. For
example, the Court in Eldred v. Ashcroft, makes that interpretative assumption. Eldred v.
Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 192–93 (2003). It splits the various “and” clauses and matches first half
with first half, second half with second half: thus “Authors” is matched with “Science” and
“Writings,” and presumably “Inventors” is matched with “useful Arts” and “Discoveries.” Id.;
see also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
However, note how the full constitutional clause uses the word “respective”:
the word appears only near the end, before “Writings and Discoveries.” Id. The word
“respective” is an adjective that means “belonging or relating separately to each of
two or more people or things.” Alleged Misuse of the Word “Respective”,
STACKEXCHANGE , http://english.stackexchange.com/questions/84766/alleged-misuseof-the-word-respective (last visited Nov. 19, 2014).
“Respective” is inserted to make clear to the reader of the Constitution that
“Writings” belong only to “Authors,” and “Discoveries” belong only to “Inventors.”
Had parallelism been intended throughout, it would have flowed naturally;
there would have been no need for the word “respective.” The presence and placement
of the indicator “respective” indicates that parallelism was not the overall scheme of
the clause. It was only the scheme governing the last two pairs.
Therefore, the phrase “Science and useful Arts” was not to be split; it was to
be taken as a unit. Promoting the Progress of both Science and useful Arts was the
goal for authors’ rights and for inventors’ rights.
So construed, the Copyright Clause would read: “Congress shall have
Power . . . [t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts . . . by securing for
limited Times to Authors . . . the exclusive Right to their . . . Writings.”
This interpretation (based on the Framers’ use of the word “respective” in
the clause) does not impact my immediate argument. I include it simply to explain
why I do not use the common formulation that limits “authors” to furthering
“Science.”
108.
Pollack, supra note 91, at, 755–57.
109.
Id. Her argument is more complex than my summary.
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After all, she points out, if an increase in substantive
knowledge were the only goal, the Framers could have omitted
“Progress” and simply said “to promote science and useful
arts.”110 She suggests that “Progress” must therefore mean
something else. She argues it means “geographic spread.”111
The argument is intriguing. Later, Orrin Hatch and
Thomas Lee essentially followed Professor Pollack’s linguistic
approach in arguing that “Progress” must refer to
dissemination because otherwise the Clause would be
redundant.112
However, during the Enlightenment, “Progress” had
several connotations that release the Constitution’s use of the
word from charges of either redundancy or surplusage—and do
so without reaching out to borderline meanings such as
“spread” or “dissemination.” “Progress” connoted optimism and
teleology, process and participation, ongoing interaction rather
than arrival at a fixed state of being.113 Thus, for example,
James Madison used phrases like “reason in her progress
towards perfection.”114
To sum up: “Progress” in knowledge connotes, among
other things, a continual need to strive for enlightenment; the
word need not refer to “geographic spread” or “dissemination”
to avoid surplusage in the Clause. For these reasons, the word
“Progress” does not support the Eldred and Golan approach to
understanding copyright’s constitutional purpose.
B. Illustration
Let me illustrate what it might mean to separate
incentives to creativity from incentives to noncreative activity.
Consider a thought experiment involving a record produced at
a music recording session. A composer’s creativity has
contributed to the end result, as has the instrumentalists’
creativity, the singers’ creativity, the arrangers’ creativity, and

110.
Id. at 788–89.
111.
Id. at 801–02.
112.
Hatch & Lee, supra note 91, at 11–12 (relying on Malla Pollock to claim that
“Progress” in the Copyright Clause of the constitution must refer to dissemination to
avoid redundancy in the document’s text).
113.
See Pollack, supra note 91, at 773–74, 803–04 (“Mankind as a whole would
‘progress’ because of the large number of individuals who would have the opportunity
to add onto what earlier individuals had learned.”).
114.
James Madison, Address of the General Assembly to the People of the
Commonwealth of Virginia (1799), reprinted in 6 T HE WRITINGS OF J AMES MADISON
332, 337 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1906).
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the creativity of the sound recording engineer.115 Today, all
those persons might have a copyright claim,116 but that is not
necessary for the thought experiment.
Assume for the moment that the creative activities of all
of these people were supported in a manner that needed no
royalties or salary. Maybe they are supported by MacArthur
grants, maybe by government, maybe by patrons, maybe by
copyright law as it stands today; this is a thought experiment
in which the source needn’t be specified.
Now add to the mix a record company which specializes in
manufacturing, advertising, and distributing records; assume it
holds many copyrights by assignment from musicians. The
company claims—and can prove—that it would thrive better if
copyright were expanded. (Perhaps the company wants to expand
section 106 to embrace rights over private as well as public
performance or wants to reduce the scope of copyright law’s
exceptions for benefit performances.) Assume that the company’s
lobbying effort is triggered not by star performers’ demands for
royalties—the terms of the hypothesis specify that all performers
are monetarily satisfied—but by the company’s accurate perception
that the requested increase in copyright strength would enable both
an increase in dissemination and an increase in its profits.
Under my view, Congress would be exceeding its legitimate
copyright powers to enact the copyright expansion desired by the
record
company.
Certainly
government
could
increase
dissemination under other powers—interstate commerce for the
federal government, general police power for the states—but not via
grants of copyright. Under the terms of my thought experiment, the
115.
To any who doubt that creativity lies also in the role of the sound engineer,
I recommend reading This Is Your Brain on Music. See DANIEL J. LEVITIN, T HIS IS
YOUR BRAIN ON MUSIC 105–06 (2006) (detailing the creativity of the sound engineer).
116.
The composer would have a “musical work” copyright, and the others would
have a joint “sound recording” copyright. 17 U.S.C. § 102 (2012). (Incidentally: if the
people in the recording studio were employees working in the scope of their
employment, the employer would possess the copyright; needless to say, fraudulent
claims of “employer” status have often arisen.)
A “musical work” is essentially a set of instructions (sometimes embodied in sheet
music) that tells performers what sounds to make. A musical work resembles a recipe that
gives instructions on making a cake. A “sound recording” is the embodied performance—that
is, the cake. Both activities—creating musical works and creating sound recordings—can
involve immense creativity: consider both Bach the composer, and Glenn Gould as Bach’s
interpreter.
In addition, if the band’s arrangement of the underlying music is sufficiently
creative, and if they had an explicit license under 17 U.S.C. § 115(a)(2), the band could also
have a “musical work” copyright in the way they arranged the notes.
Someone who copied the record without permission would be liable in copyright
infringement to the musical-work copyright owner(s) and the owner(s) of copyright in the
sound recording, since both works of authorship were copied when the record was duplicated.
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music has sufficient incentive to be created and fixed in a tangible
medium. So, ex hypothesis, the music exists. Once works are
created, their copies and phonorecords are much like any other
physical good. Distributors of valuable physical goods may need
special assistance in special circumstances. But such assistance
should not take the form of expanding copyright, for any such
expansion also expands the ability of someone to forbid the use of
expressive works.
C. Noncreative Dissemination: Why Might Giving It
Constitutional Status Have Seemed Plausible?
Why might furthering noncreative dissemination appear
plausible as a legitimate purpose of copyright? First, and most
obviously: the Constitution speaks of “Progress,” copyright makes
dissemination easier, and dissemination is often a requisite for
Progress to occur.117 Creativity concealed makes little contribution
to the public weal.
Second, both history and contemporary experience show that
publishers and other disseminators profit from selling
copyrighted works, and that they are active in lobbying for
copyright.118 Perhaps Congress had their welfare in mind.
Third, many copyright doctrines—ranging from now-extinct
doctrines that gave special importance to publication, to stillvalid rights such as the “right to distribute”—give importance to
dissemination.
Given all this, it is not surprising that the Supreme Court
gave dissemination unwarranted justificatory significance. But
when one looks more closely at the signposts that may have led
the Court “down the garden path,” the signs will turn out to
recommend quite a different road.
The Article will next address, first, the analytic issue of
dissemination’s economic importance and its role in furthering
Progress.119 Second, it will comment on the history and experience
of publisher involvement in copyright.120 Third, provisions of statute
and doctrine that seem to privilege or emphasize dissemination will
be examined.121
117. See Pollack, supra note 91, at 758–59 (“Correcting the reading of the Progress Clause
by recognizing that ‘progress’ involves dissemination, as opposed to qualitative improvement of
the knowledge base, has important results.”).
118.
See e.g., Disney Lobbying For Copyright Extension No Mickey Mouse Effort,
supra note 39, § 1, at 22 (documenting Disney’s lobbying efforts to extend copyright).
119.
See infra Parts IV.D, VI.
120.
See infra Part V.
121.
See infra Part V.B–E.
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It will become clear that disseminators are honored in
copyright only for the purpose of assisting authorial incentives.
When their interest does not serve authors too, the publisher
interest should be irrelevant to a copyright statute’s
constitutionality.
D. Incentives for Dissemination and Incentives for Creation:
Insights from the Arrow Information Paradox
Economic analysts sometimes describe copyright law’s
statutory provisions as aiming to achieve a beneficial compromise
between copyright’s positive effect of inducing initial creativity
and copyright’s negative effect of reducing dissemination.122
Copyright’s negative effect arises because, once a work is created,
copyright enables the work to be priced above marginal cost and
thus reduces the number of copies disseminated. If each copy
were priced at marginal cost, by contrast, more people would buy
copies than they buy at the higher, copyright price; every person
who values a copy above marginal cost but below actual price
does without. That consumer then shifts his or her purchase to a
less-desired resource, giving rise to the social burden of
“deadweight loss.”123
Determining the extent of the deadweight loss is complex
and difficult, even if one looks only to the benefits lost by the
frustrated consumer and ignores the benefits which that person
could have created for others had he or she possessed access to
the work. Stan Liebowitz has provided the best graphical
depiction of the complexity;124 at its center lies the perception
that every rule of copyright produces social gain for those works
that would not have arisen but for that rule’s incentives, but
produces deadweight loss for every work that would have arisen

122.
See, e.g., William Landes & Richard Posner, An Economic Analysis of Copyright
Law, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 325, 326–29, 347–49 (1989); see also Stanley M. Besen & Leo J.
Raskind, An Introduction to the Law and Economics of Intellectual Property, J. ECON.
PERSP., Winter 1991, at 3, 6.
123.
Deadweight loss also has a component of producer loss. See Oren Bracha &
Talha Sayed, Beyond the Incentive–Access Paradigm? Product Differentiation & Copyright
Revisited, 92 TEX. L. REV. 1841, 1843–46, 1872–75 (2014) (discussing how higher pricing
and deadweight loss from copyright attracts market entrants offering close substitutes,
pushing prices to a lower equilibrium); Stan J. Liebowitz, Copyright Law, Photocopying,
and Price Discrimination, in 8 RESEARCH IN LAW & ECONOMICS 181 (John P. Palmer, Jr.
& Richard O. Zerbe, eds., 1986) (diagramming the “decreased output of embodiments of
those products which would have been produced without any remuneration to the creator
of the product”), available at http://www.utdallas.edu/~liebowit/knowledge_goods
/rle/rle1986.html.
124.
Liebowitz, supra note 123; see also Gordon, supra note 66, at 180–86, 195–96
(discussing Liebowitz’s approach).
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with a less expansive copyright.125 Much lively debate surrounds
the question of what kind of fine-tuning copyright needs in order
to ensure that social gain exceeds social loss.
One thing that has emerged from the debate is a recognition
that—although copyright constrains the number of copies held by
the public because of the higher prices—copyright in appropriate
circumstances can also aid dissemination.126 This is a central
point made by Richard Watt’s book on copyright economics: that
the so-called tension between incentives and access is
overstated.127 The prospect of above-marginal-cost pricing entices
some publishers who might not otherwise take the risk, to
engage in distributing creative works to the public.128
What would be the impact on cases like Eldred and Golan if
the dissemination effects of copyright could be empirically
investigated, and if investigation proved that on the whole
dissemination was more aided than repressed by copyright? Even
if we had such proof (which we do not), it would not prove that
copyright is an appropriate way to foster dissemination on those
occasions when disseminator interests and author interests
diverge.
Policy argument should honor the distinction between what
“is” and what “ought” to be done (also known as the “fact/value”
distinction).129 That as a factual matter copyright can help
disseminators does not indicate that copyright should do so.
Among other things, tools exist for Congress to employ if it wants
to help disseminators that are far more suitable and far less
speech-repressive than copyright.
125.
Note that deadweight loss isn’t all-or-nothing. Deadweight loss will vary across
a range of different works: for example, society might experience a great deal of loss from
long copyrights given to those works that would have come into existence even with no
copyright at all; society might experience a lesser loss from long copyrights given to those
works that needed copyright to come into existence but did not need for their incentive a
term as long as the term actually in force; and so on. See Liebowitz, supra note 123. A
work that needed the precise incentives provided by law would not exist without the law;
therefore, as Liebowitz points out, as to that work, the law has caused no loss deadweight
or otherwise. A law that gives more protection than necessary produces deadweight loss
to that extent. Id. Thus, deadweight loss arises only as to works that would have been
produced in the absence of copyright, or would have been produced in the presence of a
much shorter (or otherwise more limited) copyright.
126.
Barnett, supra note 91, at 389.
127.
RICHARD WATT, COPYRIGHT AND ECONOMIC THEORY 3–5 (2000).
128.
See id. at 5–7.
129.
A famous example of the fact/value distinction is this statement by Justice
Holmes, disagreeing with the majority in International News Service v. Associated Press
which had just created a common law right over facts: “Property, a creation of law, does
not arise from value, although exchangeable—a matter of fact.” Int’l News Serv. v.
Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 246 (1918) (Holmes, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part).

Do Not Delete

646

11/30/2014 3:21 PM

HOUSTON LAW REVIEW

[52:2

An argument that sometimes seems to highlight the prodissemination function of intellectual property law is the
information paradox articulated by Kenneth Arrow.130 Thus,
William Baumol recommended using the Arrow Information
Paradox to explore ways in which copyright can better “promote
dissemination.”131 Yet Arrow’s paradox ultimately focuses not on
dissemination but on creation.
This is how Arrow summarized his point: “[T]here is a
fundamental paradox in the determination of demand for
information: its value for the purchaser is not known until he has
the information, but then he has in effect acquired it without
cost.”132 The underlying story would go roughly like this:
Someone has a piece of information which is potentially
profitable; to motivate someone else to buy or license the
information, its possessor must reveal it; in the absence of legal
protections, a potential disseminator could discuss purchase,
decline, and then walk off with the information without paying.
The prospect of losing the idea to the potential disseminator
could keep the creative person silent; lacking information about
what he or she is expected to buy, the potential buyer walks
away; and the information goes undisclosed even if the frustrated
participants wish otherwise. The situation is a kind of prisoner’s
dilemma: the parties would gain from cooperation, but
cooperation may not occur because high penalties attend those
who cooperate when others defect.133 If the law gives postdisclosure rights, however, the behavior changes: information can
be disclosed, negotiated over, and disseminated.
Sometimes readers jump from Arrow’s observation to the
conclusion that the paradox “proves” intellectual property rights
are justified; from there they might infer a theory of justification
130.
Kenneth J. Arrow, Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for
Invention, in THE RATE AND DIRECTION OF INVENTIVE ACTIVITY: ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL
FACTORS 609, 615 (1962), available at http://www.nber.org/chapters/c2144.pdf. This
paradox is distinct from Arrow’s more famous “impossibility theorem” on voting and social
choice.
131.
William J. Baumol, Intellectual Property: How the Right to Keep It to Yourself
Promotes Dissemination, 2 REV. ECON. RES. COPYRIGHT ISSUES, no. 2, 2005, at 17 (using
patent examples, and suggesting that the Arrow paradox be applied to improving
copyright law).
132.
Arrow, supra note 130, at 615.
133.
For other prisoners’ dilemma situations arising in creative production, see, for
example, Wendy J. Gordon, Asymmetric Market Failure and Prisoner’s Dilemma in
Intellectual Property, 17 U. DAYTON L. REV. 853, 859–68 (1992) (“The prisoner’s dilemma,
when present, arguably presents a set of powerful incentives not to create.”); Gordon,
Intellectual Property, supra note 23, at 640–41 (“One can use the prisoner’s dilemma in
another way, both to illuminate the case for giving exclusive rights over inexhaustible
intangibles, and to illuminate the case for not giving such rights.”).
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that emphasizes dissemination. But those conceptual steps would
be unwarranted.
It is true that when Arrow introduced the “paradox” in his
famous piece, he did so in a scenario where incentives to create or
innovate were not at issue. That’s clear from the fact pattern
with which the relevant section of his article begins: “Suppose in
one part of the information system an observation has been
made . . . .”134 Arrow hypothesizes that the observation contains
valuable information which its possessor may be frustrated in
exploiting.
So Arrow does begin to explore the paradox in terms of preexisting information. Yet the scenario involving allocation of
already-existing information is quickly put to other use as Arrow
turns to his primary topic, that is, incentives for producing
rather than merely disseminating information.135
The paradox has obvious incentive implications: unless
disclosure and publication are possible, the author or inventor
gets no royalties.
Copyright and patent provide one of many potential
solutions for the dilemma that Arrow describes. These federal
laws enable an author or inventor to disclose a previously secret
manuscript or invention with relatively little fear that the
potential disseminator will be able to walk away and profit from
the disclosure without paying. However, solutions exist for the
stalemate other than creating new rights;136 and if rights are
needed, they can stop well short of “property” rights.137
Also, of course, the “is/ought” distinction recurs: that
copyright sometimes aids dissemination (as a factual matter)

134.
Arrow, supra note 130, at 614.
135.
Id. at 616. Arrow writes that the article will “now apply the discussion” of the
paradox (along with a discussion of risk), to the issue of “Invention as the Production of
Information.” Id.
136.
Michael Burstein and others show that legal protection against uncompensated
disclosure can even be rendered unnecessary by many nonlegal devices, such as piecemeal
disclosures during negotiations. Michael Burstein, Exchanging Information Without
Intellectual Property, 91 TEX. L. REV. 227, 247, 251–52 (2012). Another such device arises
“naturally,” namely, from the high level of know-how that’s required before a disclosed
invention can be effectively exploited. (Although I suspect patent-type information
requires more know-how to utilize than typical copyright subject matters.) Other devices
include physical barriers encryption. Especially when backed by the Digital Millennium
Copyright Act (DMCA), encryption and digital water-marking may enlarge copyright
owners’ physical abilities to control post-dissemination uses of their work. All devices
have their own costs, however.
137.
Personal rights (arising out of in personam doctrines such as breach of
confidential relations and quasi-contract) are often adequate to discourage use or
disclosure after negotiations fail. Personal rights pose much less threat to public liberty
than do in rem property rights such as patent and copyright.

Do Not Delete

648

11/30/2014 3:21 PM

HOUSTON LAW REVIEW

[52:2

does not dictate what normative impact dissemination should
have, whether in constitutional discussions or otherwise. Finally,
as a matter of descriptive economics, it’s worth repeating that it’s
an unsolved empirical issue whether any pro-dissemination
contributions that copyright might make in solving the Arrow
paradox do, or do not, outweigh the restraints on dissemination
that copyright also causes.
As mentioned, William Baumol suggested applying the
paradox to copyright. When we do so, we find that the need to
“solve the paradox” regarding disclosure and dissemination has
much more force when applied to inventorship (the domain of
patent law) than when applied to authorship (the domain of
copyright law).
This occurs because inventions often constitute inputs to
other products; for example, an innovation can reduce the cost of
producing a product, or increase its quality, and the inventor can
make and sell the ultimate product. Therefore, an inventor who
lacked post-disclosure protection for ideas might be able to profit
from the reduced price or improved quality yet avoid disclosure
entirely.138 So long as the inventor can keep the secret within his
or her own manufacturing plant, that inventor need not sell or
disclose the invention.139
Note that an invention that is used but still secret is
disseminated in some sense because its benefits, though
embedded invisibly in products, are spread among the populace.
But such an invention is not disseminated in the fuller sense that
would allow the public to understand it, or downstream
innovators to employ and build on it. Disclosure of the
information itself is important, and for many inventions, legal
protections can make the crucial difference in an inventor’s
decision whether or not to disclose. Moreover, patent law
explicitly requires public disclosure as a condition of
protection.140
By contrast with inventors, creative authors typically have
no option of using their ideas without disclosing them; novelists,
138.
Even where the invention can be used as a secret input to a product, licensing
might be desirable. “Use of the information by the original possessor . . . may not be of
much use to the owner . . . . Since he may not be able to exploit it as effectively as others.”
See Arrow, supra note 130, at 615.
139.
Trade secrecy law can be important in making the produce-it-yourself option,
though note that the doctrines of trade-secrecy are open to as many questions of
justification (perhaps more) than are the doctrines of copyright and patent. See, e.g.,
Robert Bone, A New Look at Trade Secret Law: Doctrine in Search of Justification, 86
CALIF. L. REV. 241 (1998).
140.
See U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFF., www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/mpep
/s2164.html (last visited Nov. 16, 2014).
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painters, and singers sometimes produce inputs (as do the
writers of computer programs141), but usually what creative
persons produce is the ultimate product—the novel, the graphic
design, the music. The primary ways to profit from such things
are to publish, distribute, or perform them—leaving their
authors forced to disclose to the public if they are to profit at
all.142
Lacking the ability to profit without disclosure, creative
persons who lacked rights to control post-disclosure use would
nevertheless be forced by economic necessity to disclose and take
their chances.143 Thus, for products like books that “bear their
secrets on their face,” disclosure is inevitably bound up with the
best route to reaping profit, and exclusive rights would usually be
unnecessary for disclosure to happen. By contrast, for such
information goods what might be facilitated by solving the Arrow
paradox is obtaining capital and income:144 as disclosure and
dissemination become more profitable, authorial incentives may
increase.
So for copyright, the Arrow paradox focuses our attention not
on dissemination and disclosure, but primarily on initial incentives.
Ironically, although the dissemination perspective led to
validating an expansive copyright in Eldred and Golan, copyright
might have a particular vulnerability if conceived of as an
adjunct to publication. The vulnerability might arise because
technological change has drastically reduced the cost of
dissemination for many works.145
141.
In the United States, computer programs receive copyright protection on the
theory that computer programs are “authored” works. In many ways, programs are
unsuited for copyright—most obviously, because they are functional components of
machines. See, e.g., Lloyd Weinreb, Copyright in Functional Expression, 111 HARV. L.
REV. 1149 (1998); see also Pamela Samuelson et al., A Manifesto Concerning the Legal
Protection of Computer Programs, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 2308 (1994).
142.
I suppose another route is to have the luck to find a very rich and eccentric
individual collector.
143.
The same probably applies to inventions that cannot be kept secret because, for
example, they disclose their secrets on their face—one example is the safety pin. See
Burstein, supra note 136, at 249–50 (discussing the excludability of a patent when “[t]he
value-creating characteristics of the invention are apparent on its face”). As to such
inventions, trade secrecy law is unavailable. In such cases, the inventor may have as
strong a desire for post-disclosure rights as does an author and would feel the same
pressure as an author might to disclose whether or not she had devices to discourage
uncontrolled post-disclosure use by strangers.
144.
A publisher will be more likely to sign a contract to pay royalties if he or she can
be secure from unauthorized copying. See id. at 241–43 (“[A]n inventor who seeks
resources and skills for development must convince sources of financing or potential
development partners that it is worth their effort to commit resources to the invention.”).
145.
This is an assertion about what publishing costs, not about what it costs authors
to produce new work.
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Congress
might
nevertheless
be
concerned
with
disseminators’ welfare: clearly disseminators have some costs
(e.g., gatekeeper/sorting/quality-review) that remain high even in
the presence of digitization, and satisfactory alternatives have
not always been found for publisher business models stressed by
digitization. But is copyright the route to help them, if help they
need?
So, let us assume that copyright makes it easier for
disseminators and authors to make deals, and that these deals
are welfare enhancing. The publishers pay authors, either for
licenses or assignments, and the prospect of receiving such
payment induces more creative activity. One might say that the
primary claim that publishers have to payment via copyright is
as an “agent” of the author with whom they have made a
contract.146
Later, I will examine other claims that publishers might
assert. But for now, just note the simple point: that if copyright
were lacking, only those publishers who pay authors would face
ruinous price competition at the hands of nonpaying competitive
copyists. Publishers who don’t pay authors are already able to
price their physical products at a low level.147
In sum: dissemination is important to Progress. Copyright aids
dissemination by inducing creation of the things to be disseminated
and inducing disseminators to pay creators.148 The crucial fulcrum
is the creative author.149 Copyright may also foster the organization
and functioning of publishing entities.150 But that is a happy
byproduct, not itself a reason to enact or expand copyright law.

Remember this Article is not questioning copyright that serves artists (even if it
serves artists indirectly, by increasing dissemination). The Article instead questions
copyright that serves publishing without serving creativity.
The increased distribution that is made possible by the Internet and the
ubiquity of digital-copying devices constitutes a form of increased productivity. If a
novelist wants to quit her day job and write full-time, she may still require copyright to
take advantage of the increased productivity. Cf. William J. Baumol & W.G. Bowen, On
the Performing Arts: The Anatomy of Their Economic Problems, 55 AM. ECON. REV. 495,
499–500 (1965) (illustrating how stable-productivity inputs tend to be rewarded less than
increasing-productivity inputs; where a performer can only sell his artistry “once,” his
wages will tend to be low).
146. I am indebted to Richard Watt for the “agency” analogy. WATT, supra note 127, at 91.
147.
Wendy J. Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure: A Structural and Economic
Analysis of the Betamax Case and Its Predecessors, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1600, 1610–13
(1982).
148.
Id. at 1602; see also Barnett, supra note 91, 405–06.
149.
Gordon, supra note 147, at 1610 (stating that without control over their works,
creators would lack incentive thereby reducing the intellectual productions that appear in
the market).
150.
Id. at 1612–13.
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V. PUBLISHER INVOLVEMENT IN COPYRIGHT: HISTORY AND
EXPERIENCE
Admittedly, publishers do profit from copyright.151 Aside
from deals with “star” authors, like movie stars152 and bestselling novelists, it is even likely that more monetary gains from
author-publisher deals accrue to the publishers than to the
authors.153 But these real world facts say nothing about why
copyright was created in the first instance, or about whether
copyright would be justified today if it served solely to increase
publisher revenues.
That disseminators profit from copyright explains
disseminator involvement in copyright lobbying.154 But when
courts consider the sources of legitimacy for a challenged statute,
no decision I have ever read lets its answer rest on “whose
pressure produced the statute.”155
A. The Role of Dissemination and Publication in Copyright
Statutes and Doctrines
Another possible reason for the Court’s odd perspective on
noncreative dissemination is the undeniably important role that
dissemination has always had in American copyright law. The
federal statutes from the beginning have included a right to
control distribution.156 Also, and more important for the Golan
151.
And of course, some disseminators also profit from absence of copyright. For
example, photocopy shops, and those commercial websites or publishers that themselves
own no significant copyrights, make more profit the more works they can copy free of legal
restraint.
152.
Acting is a creative activity protected via the copyright in audio-visual works, 17
U.S.C. § 102(a)(6) (2012), the copyright in pantomimes, id. § 102(a)(4), and the copyright
in sound recordings, id. § 102(a)(7). See also H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 53 (1976)
(explaining grant of copyright protection to “pantomimes and choreographic works”).
Although most performers may be involved in “joint works” with the other participants,
the issue of whether an actor’s recorded performance can have its own separate copyright
will shortly receive more explication, as the Ninth Circuit has granted an en banc
rehearing in Garcia v. Google, Inc., 766 F.3d 929 (9th Cir.), reh’g granted, No. 12-57302,
2014 WL 5840553 (9th Cir. Nov. 12, 2014).
153.
Given any gain to be reaped by cooperation, it is always possible for one or the
other party to obtain a larger share because of factors such as bargaining strength,
greater knowledge, negotiation skills, or uniqueness.
154.
See Gordon, supra note 66, at 171 n.40.
155.
This sentence obviously over-simplifies; the issue of how to address lobbying
influence is more complex question than I can explore here. One datum worth noting,
though, is the unusually strong role lobbyists have played in developing the details of U.S.
copyright law. See generally JESSICA LITMAN, DIGITAL COPYRIGHT (2006).
156.
In the first U.S. statute, in 1790, copyright owners were given exclusive rights
to “print, reprint, publish, or vend.” Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, 1 Stat. 124, 124. Today’s
statutory distribution right goes beyond vending (to “vend” is to sell). Today’s copyright
owners have the exclusive right “to do and to authorize” the “distribut[ion of] copies or
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Court, was the pre-1978 rule that subjected authorial works to a
fuzzy divide between federal and state rights, one of whose
borders was called “publication.”157
Today both published and unpublished works are protected
federally; prior to 1978, “published” works were subject to
different rules than “unpublished” ones. In particular, only
published works were required to bear a copyright notice.
Further, upon publication with notice, a great variety of works
could obtain federal protection, while for unpublished works, a
smaller set of categories was eligible for federal copyright.
State copyright, termed “common law copyright,”158 was
available to protect a work prior to publication, even if the work
was also eligible to seek federal registration. After publication,
only federal statutory copyright law could protect the work from
copying.
The Golan Court drew from these facts the following
incorrect inference: “Until 1976, in fact, Congress made ‘federal
copyright contingent on publication[,] [thereby] providing
incentives not primarily for creation,’ but for dissemination.”159
This statement by the Golan Court is simply unfounded. Not
even the source that the Court cited (an article by Shira
Perlmutter160) fully supports it.
To examine the fault lines in the Court’s reasoning one by
one: First, publication is the mode through which authors receive
most of the payoffs whose lure provided them monetary
incentives to create. It is hard to imagine how the phenomenon
could be twisted into a congressional goal of “providing incentives
not primarily for creation.”161
Second, it is not correct that prior to the 1976 Act, federal
copyright was “contingent on publication.”162 To the contrary, a
great many unpublished works were entitled to obtain federal

phonorecords of the copyrighted work to the public by sale or other transfer of ownership,
or by rental, lease, or lending.” 17 U.S.C. § 106(3).
157.
See Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873, 888–89 (2012); see also 17 U.S.C. § 301
historical and revision notes (Single Federal System). The publication-based distinction
between unpublished (state) and published (federal) copyright laws was abolished by the
1976 Copyright Act, whose provisions became effective January 1, 1978. 17 U.S.C. § 301.
158.
The same terminology applied whether the state copyright law originated from
case law or statute.
159.
Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 889–89 (quoting Shira Perlmutter, Participation in the
International Copyright System as a Means to Promote the Progress of Science and Useful
Arts, 36 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 324, 324 n.5 (2002)).
160.
See generally Perlmutter, supra note 159, as discussed further below.
161.
Id. at 324 n.5 (emphasis added).
162.
Id.
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copyright by registering with the U.S. Copyright Office.163 This
was recognized even by the source upon which the Court
relied.164
Third, as the Supreme Court has itself recognized in other
contexts, the dividing line between state and federal protection
was not dissemination per se, but rather the determination by
Congress “that a particular category of ‘writing’ is worthy of
national protection and the incidental expenses of federal
administration.”165 Indeed, in the past, the Court had rejected an
invitation to find “publication” equivalent to “dissemination,”
and, instead, dismissively viewed “publication” as “only” a “term
of art.”166
In short, the pre-1976 Congress considered publication a
good marker for the point at which most writings became of
national interest rather than of “purely local concern.”167 For the
163.
Sections 9 and 10 of the 1909 Act provided for federal copyright to arise when
copies were “published” with proper notice and other requisites were fulfilled. The Act’s
next section gave protection for unpublished works:
That copyright may also be had of the works of an author of which copies are not
reproduced for sale, by the deposit, with claim of copyright, of one complete copy
of such work if it be a lecture or similar production or a dramatic or musical
composition; of a photographic print if the work be a photograph; or of a
photograph or other identifying reproduction thereof, if it be a work of art or a
plastic work or drawing. But the privilege of registration of copyright secured
hereunder shall not exempt the copyright proprietor from the deposit of copies,
under sections twelve and thirteen of this Act where the work is later
reproduced in copies for sale.
Act of Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 320, sec. 11, 35 Stat. 1075 (emphasis added). Through an
amendment, this provision later became section 12, with slightly different language.
164.
See supra note 159 and accompanying text (presenting the relied-upon
Perlmutter sentence in full).
165.
Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 559 (1973). Until 1976, two such
categories were (a) “published” works and (b) a designated group of “unpublished” ones; in
1976, Congress expanded the categories to cover a larger number of unpublished works.
(We might note, incidentally, that the Congress decision to embrace in federal all fixed
works, even the unpublished ones, copyright is hardly a move consistent with giving
“publication” the role the Golan Court attributes to it.)
166.
“For purposes of federal law, ‘publication’ serves only as a term of the art which
defines the legal relationships which Congress has adopted under the federal copyright
statutes.” Goldstein, 412 U.S. at 570 n.28.
167.
Id. at 560 (allowing state copyright in sound recordings.) The Court in Goldstein
recognized that Congress gave protection when it “determines that a particular category
of ‘writing’ is worthy of national protection and the incidental expenses of federal
administration.” Id. at 559. It is from publication (and performance) that most authors
reap the royalties that constitute their incentives.
What is more interesting is why common law copyright stopped its protection at
publication. I think the matter had more to do with state versus federal competencies than
with preemption. Nevertheless, it is true that federal copyright in the 1909 Act saved only
“unpublished” works from preemption. See Act of Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 320, sec. 2, 35 Stat. 1075.
The 1909 Act as amended is available at http://www.kasunic.com/1909_act.htm. In its original
form the 1909 Act can be found at http://legisworks.org/congress/60/publaw-349.pdf.
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Golan Court to conclude otherwise is puzzling, particularly as its
interpretation rested on nothing more than a bare statement in
an article footnote168—a statement which the Court in fact had
truncated. (The ellipses in the majority’s quotation referred to
omitted language that, in the original footnote cited, had referred
to the way that federal law pre-1976 had allowed registration as
well as publication to trigger federal copyright protection.
Federal law through registration protected many types of
unpublished work,169 albeit a narrower range of types than
federal copyright would protect after publication with notice.) To
fully appreciate the lack of foundation underlying the Golan
Court’s assertion requires some discussion of history.
Let me examine the two features of federal copyright law
relied upon by the Golan majority: the pre-1978 use of
“publication” as a dividing line, and the federal law’s exclusive
right of distribution. I begin with “publication,” and a brief recap
of the rules over the last century.
B. Summing up the Role of “Publication” in Federal and State
Copyright Law
For most of America’s history, as described earlier,
“publication” usually ended a state copyright.170 By judicial
definition, publication involved general distribution of copies.
Works which were performed widely were not necessary
“published,” and the federal statute explicitly preserved state
rights over unpublished works from preemption.171
168.
The Court cited note 5 of Shira Perlmutter’s article written in support of the
government’s position in Eldred. See supra note 159.
169. The Perlmutter footnote was quoted only in part. The language omitted by the Court
made reference to the ability of pre-1976 authors to register their unpublished works with the
U.S. Copyright Office and gain federal copyright thereby. In the following quotation from the
quoted footnote, I have put into italics some of the language omitted by the Court:
Indeed, U.S. copyright law prior to 1976 made the enjoyment of federal copyright
contingent on publication with notice or on registration (with unpublished and
unregistered works being protected by state common law), providing incentives
not primarily for creation but for the subsequent acts of publication or
registration, both of which were perceived to benefit the public.
Perlmutter, supra note 159, at 324 n.5 (emphasis added) (citing Act of Mar. 4, 1909, ch.
320, sec. 12, 35 Stat. 1075). Section 12 of the 1909 Act, which she cites, is the section
giving many categories of unpublished works a route to federal protection.
170. Sound recordings were an apparent exception to state self-restraint, in that a
California statute gave rights over disseminated recordings. The rights were held not
preempted in Goldstein v. California. Those California rights arose out of a state criminal
statute.
The Supreme Court refused to rule on whether the dissemination of records
amounted to publication. Goldstein, 412 U.S. at 568–71 & n.28.
171.
The 1909 Act provided: “Nothing in this title shall be construed to annul or limit
the right of the author or proprietor of an unpublished work, at common law or in equity,
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Works within enumerated categories (generally, works likely
to be performed publicly) were eligible for federal protection
under the 1909 Copyright Act upon registration, even while
unpublished.172 Therefore, proprietors of works pre-publication
often had a choice between state and federal protection. All
works obtained federal copyright upon publication, so long as the
published copies had the prescribed federal notice, and the
proprietor complied with other formalities.
As mentioned, the states’ preserve for unpublished works
was explicitly honored in the 1909 Act.173 Congress sharply
curtailed the state power to grant copyright protection in the
1976 Copyright Act. That Act decreed an end to all state
copyright in “fixed” works (that is, works written down or
recorded), whether published or unpublished, effective in
1978.174 From that time to the present, federal copyright
subsists in works of authorship whether published or
unpublished, from the moment that the works are written
down or recorded.
Although the 1976 Act covered all unpublished and
published works, it continued the old law’s requirement that all
copies of a published work bear copyright notice. Until March of
1989,175 federal copyright could still be lost if published copies
failed to bear a specified form of copyright notice, although the
federal forfeiture rules were loosened somewhat between 1978
and 1989. On and after March 1, 1989, lack of notice or other
formalities ceased to be fatal.176
At that point, “publication” became remarkably less important
to copyright. Publication remained important to copyright primarily
as a matter for title searches:177 any work that had been published
without requisite notice prior to March 1989 (1) lost its federal
copyright because of the lack of notice; and (2) lost its state
to prevent the copying, publication, or use of such unpublished work without his consent,
and to obtain damages therefor.” Act of Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 320, sec. 2, 35 Stat. 1075.
172. This was section 11 in the original version of the 1909 Act as enacted. Act of Mar. 4,
1909, ch. 320, sec. 2, 35 Stat. 1075, available at http://copyright.gov/history/1909act.pdf. With
amendments, the provision became section 12. See Act of July 30, 1947, Pub. L. No. 80-281,
§ 12, 61 Stat. 652.
173.
Act of Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 320, sec. 11, 35 Stat. 1075.
174.
17 U.S.C. § 301 (2012). Interestingly, Congress preserved state rights in sound
recordings produced prior to the date that federal law granted copyright to sound
recordings. 17 U.S.C. § 301(c).
175.
This is the effective date of the Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988,
Pub. L. No. 100-568, 102 Stat. 2853, available at http://copyright.gov/title17/92appk.html.
176.
Id.
177.
The remnants of the old formality rules appear primarily at 17 U.S.C. §§ 401–
406. Prior to the Berne Convention Implementation Act in 1989, lack of notice on a
published work was fatal to federal rights, although some defects were curable.
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copyright because of publication. Today that work can be safely
used by anyone.
Let me revise that last statement: the work published
without notice in 1988 can be used by anyone unless it’s a foreign
work that’s subject to restoration. Restoration was, of course, the
focus of the statute178 upheld against constitutional challenge in
Golan.
C. Federal Law on the Effects of Publication
The Golan Court placed reliance on a purported pre-1978
“rule” that publication divided federal from state copyright. This
overstatement was then used to explain why noncreative
dissemination warranted congressional concern when enacting
copyright law. The package is puzzling.
As noted, the real rule pre-1978 did not confine federal
copyright exclusively to published works: under section 11, later
section 12, of the 1909 Act, many unpublished works were
allowed to obtain federal copyright without publication.179 The
1909 Act was written so broadly that the authoritative Copyright
Office Study on the subject noted that potentially all unpublished
works could have gained federal protection by means of
registration.180 The statute was construed more narrowly in
practice,181 but the scope of unpublished works explicitly
mentioned in the statute as entitled to registration and to federal
copyright protection was nevertheless broad:
[S]tatutory [federal] copyright is available, through
voluntary registration, for unpublished works in the classes
of lectures, etc., prepared for oral delivery; dramatic,
musical, or dramatico-musical compositions; photographs;
motion pictures; works of art; and plastic works or
drawings. In general, these are the classes of works that
are commonly disseminated by performance or exhibition as
distinguished from dissemination by the reproduction and
sale of copies.182

178.
179.
180.

17 U.S.C. § 104A.
See supra note 172 and accompanying text.
STAFF OF S. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 86TH CONG., 2D SESS., COPYRIGHT LAW
REVISION STUDY NO. 29 at 6–7 (Comm. Print 1961), available at http://copyright.gov/history/
studies/study29.pdf.
The Study notes that although section 12 mentions a number of particular
works that can be registered in unpublished form, the question of “[w]hether this
enumeration is exclusive apparently has never been decided by any court.” Id.
181.
As a practical matter only the works listed in the section were treated as eligible
for federal protection while still unpublished. Id.
182.
Id. at 7.
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As the Study points out, most works likely to become known
through performance rather than distribution could, though
“unpublished,”183 obtain federal copyright by registering. Federal
protection with its limits therefore seemed to apply when a work
promised to become important enough that national protection,
and national limits on protection,184 became needed. Publication
wasn’t the sole measure of that.
D. State Law on the Effects of Publication
State law doctrine generally extinguished state copyrights
upon publication. To know the reasons for that state doctrine
is not, strictly speaking, necessary to critique the Golan
conception of federal law. But pre-1978 federal law stepped in
when state protection ended, and the 1909 Copyright Act
explicitly left state law in unpublished works free of
preemption; such facts motivate some inquiry into the states’
reasons for usually extinguishing authorial rights after
publication. Although many of those reasons reside in history,
policies, institutional strictures, and procedural concerns
beyond our current scope, some of the reasons are quite
accessible through a functional analysis.
The common law rule evolved in older economies that lacked
technologies for sound recording or broadcasting; in such
economies, access to works would usually be quite limited until
an authorized general dissemination of copies occurred, and
states’ interest in local regulation made state involvement

183.
See Ferris v. Frohman, 223 U.S. 424, 435 (1912) (common law right was
immune to divestment by public performance); see also discussion supra note 15 and
accompanying text.
184.
The Supreme Court has maintained that federal copyright requires more
limitation than does state copyright. When a state law protecting sound recordings for a
potentially infinite period was challenged on the ground that the Constitution only
allowed copyright of “limited Times,” the Supreme Court rejected the argument,
grounding its holding on the fact that laws with local impact might not need the same
limitations as would be needed for laws of national scope:
[P]etitioners argue that the State has created a copyright of unlimited duration,
in violation of that portion of Art. I, § 8, cl. 8, which provides that copyrights may
only be granted “for limited Times.” . . . [I]t is not clear that the dangers to which
this limitation was addressed apply with equal force to both the Federal
Government and the States. When Congress grants an exclusive right or
monopoly, its effects are pervasive; no citizen or State may escape its reach. As
we have noted, however, the exclusive right granted by a State is confined to its
borders. Consequently, even when the right is unlimited in duration, any
tendency to inhibit further progress in science or the arts is narrowly
circumscribed. The challenged statute cannot be voided for lack of a durational
limitation.
Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 560–61 (1973).
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appropriate.185 Publication made sense as the terminus point
because after publication, the local concern would be attenuated.
Under early technology, it would have been hard for the
public to gain access to an unpublished creative work without
violating some kind of noncopyright law.186 To make a copy, the
potential copyist might have to violate trespass law to enter the
author’s home or office to see the original;187 violate conversion
and theft prohibitions in order to take the document;188 bribe a
servant or employee;189 or violate the contract or confidential
relation under whose shelter he had been given a copy.190 It thus
makes sense that state law evolved to create a right against the
copying of unpublished works in order to fill whatever gaps of
control were left open by the established laws of trespass,
conversion, confidential relations, theft, and contract.191 State
control over prepublication copying in such a context was not
much of an additional incursion on liberty.192
But after publication, the only way for an author to control
dissemination would be through the long arm of special copyright
laws.193 And at that point, public liberty would indeed be at
stake, and significantly so. Recall that most of the famous British
and American cases addressing whether copyright existed at
common law, or whether instead copyright needed a statutory
base, arose on the issue of whether copyright could exist without
statute after publication. Some kind of pre-publication common
law right was fairly uncontroversial.194
185.
Even the California law prohibiting “record piracy” was aimed at local concerns:
the “production of new recordings, a large industry in California.” Goldstein, 412 U.S. at
571. However, the recordings protected were disseminated, indicating a possible break
with the usual state practice of protecting only unpublished works.
186.
See generally Gordon, supra note 18.
187.
Id. at 1400.
188.
Id. at 1367–68.
189.
Id. at 1419.
190.
Id. at 1411.
191.
This is also how trade secret laws operate. Like common law copyright, they are
state-created gap fillers. Unlike copyright, though, trade secrecy laws have a special
virtue of preventing destructive arms races. See Friedman, Landes & Posner, supra note
17, at 66–67 (discussing the relationship between trade secrets and military espionage).
192.
States were free to grant copyrights for unpublished works prior to the
Copyright Act of 1976. See Gordon, supra note 18, at 1365 n.97.
193. For example, if authors want to preserve the right to disseminate their own work
after publication, they must make special agreements. See UNIV. OF CAL. BERKELEY, TAKING
BACK CONTROL: MANAGING COPYRIGHT AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (2005), available at
http://www.lib.berkeley.edu/scholarlypublishing/copyright.pdf. See generally 17 U.S.C. §§ 106–
112 (2012) (discussing the restrictions and limitations of copyright owners).
194.
Thus, while Wheaton v. Peters held no common law copyright existed in
published works, it noted that authors had a right over improper use of their
manuscripts. Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591, 658 (1834).
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After publication, only nationwide rights to control copying
and use would be effectual. Consideration of factors such as
potential threats to free speech, incursions on competition, need
for national uniformity, and the scope of behavior that crossed
state lines made federal intervention the only kind of
intervention that made sense.
Also, after publication, the “trade secrecy” rationales
disappear and enforcement would range far beyond matters
related to the original manuscript, exceeding a state’s normal
concerns with physical property, privacy, personal relations, and
safety.195 After publication there would be need for federal
protection. And with publication the work became more capable
of affecting the public sphere; as such, there also arose a sharper
need for placing federal limits on the copyright owner’s ability to
curb others’ use of his speech. The Supreme Court has in fact
found that state copyrights, limited to state borders, need
limitations less strongly than does national copyright law.196
For all these reasons, the decision in pre-1978 copyright
doctrine to use “publication” as one of the triggers that could
separate federal from state copyright gives no evidence for the
Golan position; it is hard to see in this history any support for
the proposition that the Framers or early Congresses had a goal
of serving publishers’ interests as publishers.197 Instead,
publication had functional significance in terms of limits on state
competence and in terms of need for nationwide regulation.
Nor is any such evidence provided by Congress deciding in
1976 to bring unpublished works into the federal realm (effective
in 1978, for all works “fixed in a tangible medium of
expression”).198 By the 1970s, reprographic and other
technologies had advanced. When tape recorders and broadcast
technologies became ubiquitous, the notion of an “unpublished”
oral presentation became absurd.
As intimated, I see the old “common law copyright” as
having existed in states’ classic realms—physical control and
personal relations—and as having been extinguished when a
work’s content spread beyond those close-held realms. Potential
challenges to my functional view might however be posed by the
195.
See supra note 191.
196.
See 17 U.S.C. § 303; H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 139 (1976) (“[The] basic purpose
is to substitute statutory for common law copyright for everything now protected at
common law, and to substitute reasonable time limits for the perpetual protection now
available.”).
197.
Again, the decision was made by the 1976 Congress, effective January 1, 1978.
See 17 U.S.C. §§ 102, 301.
198.
17 U.S.C. § 102(a).
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impact of performance on the old common law copyright, and by
the old common law copyright rule on letters.
Let me turn first to letters. The person sending a letter
continued to own the common law copyright in it.199 The physical
copy was owned by the recipient.
Sending the letter severed the author from physical control
of the paper. If common law copyright was really centered on
physical control of the manuscript, then the rule allowing the
author to retain common law copyright in a letter needs some
explaining. One possibility lies in the likelihood that trust might
exist between the recipient and the sender. It does not stretch
credulity to imagine that both parties to a letter understood that
the recipient was not to publish it verbatim. A long case law
history on “limited publication” reinforces the notion that no
divestment of common law copyright occurred when there was an
understanding between the sending and receiving parties.200
Ronan Deazley argues that the first major case regarding
copyright in letters marks the first steps toward a “divorce”
beginning between “the physical letter” and its “metaphysical
[intangible] context.” In that case, in 1741, a British court gave
copyright to a letter-writer despite the fact the claimant had
divested himself of physical possession; Professor Deazley says
the decision constituted a “decision of crucial significance”201
moving toward a right in intangibles. I agree as a conceptual
matter, but the context of sending and receiving letters arguably
remained sufficiently local and personal to fit state legislative
and judicial competencies.
The instance of performance is a bit more difficult to
understand in the functional terms I have proposed.
Some common law jurisdictions adopted a rule that common
law copyright vanished upon public performance.202 This makes
functional sense; the old common law copyright functioned
primarily as an adjunct to physical and personal control, and
performance can temporarily or permanently free a text from its
physical encasement and put knowledge of the contents into the
minds of people who are strangers to the author.203 When the
199.
Pope v. Curll, (1741) 26 Eng. Rep. 608; 2 Atk. 342.
200.
See, e.g., King v. Trustees of Bos. Univ., 647 N.E.2d 1196, 1199–1200 (Mass.
1995) (reading a letter indicating the parties’ intentions); see also Kiernan v. Manhattan
Quotation Tel. Co., 50 How. Pr. 194, 201 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1876) (“[T]he transmission by Mr.
Kiernan of his foreign financial news to his customers was but a qualified publication,
which did not forfeit his right of property therein.”).
201.
RONAN DEAZLEY, ON THE ORIGIN OF THE RIGHT TO COPY 74 (2004).
202.
Litman, supra note 15, at 1400.
203.
See id.
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physical and personal control ends, so should a state-granted
copyright whose rationale is based on such control.204
But through most of U.S. history, mere disclosure by oral
communication did not constitute a “publication” that divested
common law copyright.205 Most U.S. courts—and in 1912 the U.S.
Supreme Court—preserved the common law copyright no matter
how far the effects of a performance reached.206 This line of cases
poses difficulties for my view that historical common law copyright
was founded on personal relations and physical control of
manuscripts. While performance does not end the author’s physical
control—after all, the audience may be unable to remember many
details after merely seeing and hearing a play or sermon—
performance certainly does weaken it.207 That federal copyright was
available for most such unpublished works increases the difficulty
of explaining why states kept their rights available to authors after
public performances had made a work publicly known. Why bother
stretching the concept of “unpublished” so far, if federal protection
was available regardless for sermons and plays whether published
or unpublished?
An explanation may lie in the gradual nature of
technological change. The nature of performance was person-to204.
One might argue against my functional approach that state copyright was not
lost because of states’ consciousness of their own limited competence, but because of
federal preemption. That’s an intriguing question to which I cannot do full justice here.
205.
For a significant period, U.S. law allowed plays and sermons to remain
technically “unpublished”—and thus perpetually protectable by state law––even after
they were performed, so long as copies were not generally available to the public. Ferris v.
Frohman, 223 U.S. 424, 434–36 (1912). However, hints of my functional perspective
appear even in the case law of performing plays. The most intriguing case, Keene v.
Wheatley, involved unauthorized performance of the play “Our American Cousin.” Keene
v. Wheatley, 14 F. Cas. 180 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1861). The court not only indicated that public
performance would indeed waive rights as to the audiences present at the performance;
the court also made liability of an unlicensed performance hinge on how a defendant
obtained the copy of the script that it used:
[T]he defendants, against [the] will [of the person holding common-law
rights in the play], performed it repeatedly at their theatre, without having
been, directly or secondarily, enabled so to do through its impression upon the
memory of any of [the proprietor’s] audience. This was an infraction of a
proprietary right retained by the complainant. . . . [T]he complainant’s own
theatrical representations of it were not the means through which the
defendants were fairly enabled to represent it.
Id. at 207–08.
The Keene court thus implicitly followed the logic I am urging: when an author
or her assignee voluntarily takes an action (such as performance) that makes her lose
physical control of her work, she loses (at least pro tanto) common law copyright in it. In
Keene, although the authorized performance did not divest all common law rights, it did
erode common law rights as to the persons present at the performance. Id.
However, this does not seem to be the route generally taken by our courts.
206.
Ferris, 223 U.S. at 435–36.
207.
See id.

Do Not Delete

662

11/30/2014 3:21 PM

HOUSTON LAW REVIEW

[52:2

person, performer-to-audience, in the early days, rather than
performer-to-iPhone-video; it was still a realm where state law
would have a fairly comfortable “fit.” Thus, for example, “implied
contract” played a role in preserving common law copyright
despite oral delivery.208
The
verbatim
expression
contained in
an oral
communication would rarely reach far. Technologies like tape
recording and electronic broadcasting were unknown, and exact
note taking difficult. So even after performance, works that were
not generally distributed in tangible form remained largely
private or only known to a limited group. Physical control over
manuscripts still had puissance—until technology changed.
This may be what the Supreme Court had in mind when it
commented, in regard to understanding why states might want
to give sound recordings exclusive rights against copying within
their jurisdictions: “[I]n earlier times, a performing artist's work
was largely restricted to the stage; once performed, it remained
‘recorded’ only in the memory of those who had seen or heard it.
Today, we can record that performance in precise detail and
reproduce it again and again with utmost fidelity.”209
Some types of state copyright—such as state protection for
widely disseminated sound recordings—trouble my description of
state copyright as being focused on physical control and personal
relations. Speeches or sermons that might become widely known,
yet would be considered “unpublished” (and eligible for state

208.
See Litman, supra note 15, at 1383–84. Thus, Professor Deazley in Capitol
Records cites early British cases that use an audience’s “understanding” of an “implied
contract” to uphold a lecturer’s common law rights despite oral delivery. Deazley, supra
note 16, at 51. Notably:
Lord Eldon, granting an injunction against the publication of lectures that had
been delivered at St. Bartholomew’s Hospital, did so, not on copyright grounds,
but on the understanding that “all the persons who attended these lectures were
under an implied contract not to publish what they had heard, although they
might take it down for their own instruction and use.” In the present case, Lord
Watson conceded that while there was nothing “in the nature of a contract
between the professor and his students,” nevertheless the students could not
“with propriety be said to represent the general public; of course they are, each
and all of them, members of the public; but they do not attend the professor’s
lectures in that capacity.”
Id. at 51 (footnote omitted).
209.
Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 570–71 (1973) (emphasis added). When
California, having a local sound recording industry, recognized this change in technology
and gave sound recordings rights against copying some years before the federal
government did, the Supreme Court in Goldstein upheld the state protection. Federal
copyright came to sound recordings in 1972; even today, pre-1972 sound recordings are
allowed their state-based rights. See 17 U.S.C. § 301(c) (2012) (preserving such rights
from preemption until 2067).
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copyright) because the author had not distributed copies210 are
also troubling. Oral presentations of sufficient interest to bring
the attention of people with good memories—not to mention
newspapers and stenographers211—point to some weakness in my
identifying physical and relational control as the prime rationale
of the rule of publication-based division between federal and
common law copyright law. This is not fatal—no law exactly
matches any rationale with exactitude212—yet it certainly poses a
challenge.
But note: Although my notion of state copyright might have
become too narrow to be fully descriptive as state copyright
expanded to cover, e.g., letters, widely known performed work,
and recorded music, such a discrepancy would say nothing about
the purposes and scope of federal law, and it is federal law which
concerns us. I do not see how the possible discrepancy could
support the Golan Court’s belief that the importance of
“publication” to federal copyright law prior to the 1976 Act meant
that Congress had a concern with the welfare of publishers as
publishers.
I think this is true even if the state insistence on protecting
works after performance rested on a foundation of “natural
rights” theory. At various times, the U.S. courts were probably
influenced by a natural rights view, and under some variants of
natural right, the physical control that has been my focus would
become arguably less central to state copyright jurisprudence.213
Jessica Litman goes so far as to attribute the American common
law rule on performance to the influence of treatise writer (and
natural law righter) Eaton Drone.214 But natural rights theory
need not lead where Drone thought it did.215
210.
For example, in Pope v. Curll, the court discusses sermons that are unpublished
but are known because the loose-leaf copies get distributed after the author’s death. Pope
v. Curll, (1741) 26 Eng. Rep. 608; 2 Atk. 342.
211.
Some unpublished oral works were undoubtedly reported to the public in organs
such as newspapers, and verbatim transcripts can be made by the hands of speedy
stenographers. As “unauthorized” publications, such distributions would not have robbed
the speeches’ authors of their common law copyrights.
212.
See Arthur Allen Leff, Commentary, Economic Analysis of Law: Some Realism
About Nominalism, 60 VA. L. REV. 451, 482 (1974).
213.
See Litman, supra note 15, at 1414–15 (discussing Drone’s natural right
perspective and its influence on the Court’s decision in Ferris).
214.
See id. at 1411–16 (discussing Eaton Drone’s book, A Treatise on the Law of
Property in Intellectual Productions in Great Britain and the United States and its
influence on the spread of the natural rights view of common law copyright).
215.
Gordon, A Property Right in Self Expression, supra note 5, at 1535–39 (arguing
that the best natural-right view leads to strong limits on copyright and strong freedom of
speech). I rely on many of the same materials as did Drone but reach different
conclusions.
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In particular, natural rights theory need not lead to
noncreative disseminators having claims to copyright legitimacy
separate from their relations with authors. Admittedly,
disseminators are “laborers” who make social contributions. But
most explicators of natural right or “moral desert” theories in the
IP context link natural rights of ownership to authorship or
inventorship, that is, to creative labor rather than to labor per se.
Purposeful effort or labor is a necessary but not sufficient
condition for copyright or patent ownership: To have a right to
control others’ speech would constitute a “fitting and proportional
return”216 only (if ever) under narrow conditions; only some kinds
of labor (if any) will suit.217
Also, if natural right theory were linked to labor per se (as
Drone attempted to do218), in federal law in the U.S. the theory
would quickly butt heads with the language of the Constitution,
which authorized Congress to grant rights to only two classes of
deserving laborers, namely authors and inventors. This later
became quite explicit in Feist, where the U.S. Supreme Court
ruled that the products of socially beneficial labor could not earn
copyright if they lacked creativity.219
Further, linking natural rights to all forms of effort quickly
would become unintelligible (given conflicting claims) and could
undo the competitive system altogether. Competition continually
imposes undeserved harms and benefits on laboring, productive
people. If laborers are to deserve reward, something––like a link
to human intellectual capacity––must distinguish a narrow class
of laborers from the rest, if the system is not to freeze in
paralysis.
216.
Lawrence C. Becker, Deserving to Own Intellectual Property, 68 CHI.-KENT L.
REV. 609, 620 (1993).
217.
Id. This is not only true of “personality” based natural-right theories, but also of
Lockean approaches such as Becker’s or mine: Gordon, A Property Right in Self
Expression, supra note 5, at 1544–45 & n.68.
218.
Drone explicitly refused to distinguish between products of the mind and other
products of labor. In Chapter I, Drone writes:
Ownership, then, is created by production, and the producer becomes the owner.
This principle is general, and covers all productions, the whole field of labor. It
cannot be applied to the produce of one kind of labor, and withheld from that of
another. It matters not whether the labor be of the body or of the mind.
EATON S. DRONE, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PROPERTY IN INTELLECTUAL PRODUCTIONS
IN GREAT BRITAIN AND THE UNITED STATES 5 (2d ed. 2001) (1879) (emphasis added). It is
important to note that Drone was not trying to refute the proposition that activity of the
mind might be more appropriately entitled to protection than other fields of endeavor;
rather, his was a defensive argument, seeking to rebut positions that saw works of
authorship as less capable of ownership than were physical objects. In particular, Drone
sought to dispute the claim of Justice Yates that “nothing can be the object of property
which has not a corporeal substance.” Id. at 32–33.
219.
Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345–46 (1991).
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In short, my argument against Golan is left unimpaired by
the American rule that common law rights in “unpublished”
works survived performance. Let us now turn to examining the
possibility that the Golan approach is supported by the continual
presence of a distribution right in all U.S. copyright statutes.
E. The Exclusive Right over Distribution
The current U.S. right of distribution reads as follows:
Subject to [fair use and other limitations including the first
sale doctrine], the owner of copyright under this title has
the exclusive rights to do and to authorize any of the
following:220
....
(3) to distribute copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted
work to the public by sale or other transfer of ownership, or
by rental, lease, or lending . . . .221
Some see the role of the distribution right as indicating a
concern with distributors. By contrast, I argue the right is
instrumental and has nothing to do with protecting distributors
per se. It has to do with authors.222 Without a distribution right,
copyright law’s grant of rights to authors would be largely
toothless. Forgers and other copyists could sell their unlawful
copies to unknowing retailers and then scamper. Without the
right over distribution, the retailers (the only ones left on scene
to sue) would be immune to judgment. Neither of the two
established copyright doctrines of secondary liability, namely
contributory liability and vicarious liability, might reach the
retail sellers.223 Or the copyists might not flee, but might spend
220.
17 U.S.C. § 106(3) (2012). As the statute notes, there are many limitations on
the distribution right. Most important is the first sale doctrine, embodied in section
109(a), a principle also known as “exhaustion.” Section 109(a) provides that,
“Notwithstanding the provisions of section 106(3), the owner of a particular copy or
phonorecord lawfully made under this title, or any person authorized by such owner, is
entitled, without the authority of the copyright owner, to sell or otherwise dispose of the
possession of that copy or phonorecord.” 17 U.S.C. § 109(a).
Note that the first sale doctrine by its terms only immunizes the resale of
“lawfully made” copies. It has no applicability to unlawfully made copies, such as
magazines containing plagiarized or otherwise unauthorized copyrighted text, or canvases
bearing forged copies of copyrighted paintings. Id.
221.
17 U.S.C. § 106(3).
222.
Id.
223.
Under copyright law, vicarious liability requires proof that the defendant had
some control over the violative act. See generally Perfect 10, Inc. v. Visa Int’l Serv. Ass’n,
494 F.3d 788, 806 (9th Cir. 2007) (That case is controversial on its facts but stated the
basic rules accurately; it denied vicarious liability because the plaintiff failed to prove the
credit card company had the right and ability to supervise the alleged infringing conduct).
If a retailer had no control over the copying, he would therefore not be liable under
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their profits before they are caught. This could again leave the
people who have sold (distributed) the forgeries as the only
entities capable of paying a copyright judgment. Without the
distribution right, the retailers would be suable only upon proof
of knowledge.224
Admittedly, had there been no distribution right, the
doctrines of secondary liability would almost certainly have
evolved to make unknowing distributors liable. This kind of
expansion of secondary liability doctrine is what happened in the
Grokster case. There, defendant peer-to-peer computer programs
enabled unlawful copying by third parties. Essentially because
the Grokster program provided the most vulnerable “bottleneck”
to stop the copying, the Supreme Court added a new type of
secondary liability (“inducement” liability) to the list of doctrines
that could make a noncopyist liable.225 The same kind of change
to secondary liability law could have been invented to “catch”
retailers of pirated print copies.
But rather than twisting doctrines of secondary liability to
fit, it makes more sense to cut the Gordian knot (may I now call
it the Gordonian knot?) and simply make all distributors of
unlawful copies liable. Cutting the Gordian tangle of secondary
liability doctrines is what the distribution right accomplishes.
Violating the distribution right creates direct infringement.
Because ignorance and good faith are not defenses to a civil
copyright action for direct infringement, the distribution right
puts the burden of inquiry and insurance on parties probably
able to bear it. It further ensures that copyright owners can
obtain from a retailer some share of the profits made knowingly
or unknowingly from their work.226
vicarious liability. An alternative theory of secondary liability is contributory liability.
However, in copyright such liability will be imposed only if the proof shows the defendant
had knowledge of the infringing activity. Id. at 795 (stating that a defendant may be
found to be “a contributory infringer if it (1) has knowledge of a third party’s infringing
activity, and (2) ‘induces, causes or materially contributes to the infringing conduct’”
(quoting Ellison v. Robertson, 357 F.3d 1072, 1076 (9th Cir. 2004))). An unknowing
retailer would thus not be subject to secondary liability.
224.
Id. (stating that in order for a retailer to be liable, knowledge of the third party’s
infringing act must be shown).
225.
Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 940–41
(2005). The defendant had provided software that enabled others to unlawfully download
and upload copyrighted works to the Internet. Wrote the majority: “When a widely shared
service or product is used to commit infringement, it may be impossible to enforce rights
in the protected work effectively against all direct infringers, [so that] the only practical
alternative [is] to go against the [device’s] distributor . . . for secondary liability . . . .” Id.
at 929–30.
226.
See Coleman v. Payne, 698 F. Supp. 704, 708 (W.D. Mich. 1988) (stating that
damages can be awarded despite the defendant’s knowledge).
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So yes, there is a right of distribution. But its function is to
assist authors, not distributors.227 Once explained, the existence
of a section 106(3) right of distribution should stop confusing
observers into thinking that distributors themselves are the
subject of the statute’s solicitude.228
VI. PUBLISHER CLAIMS BASED ON THEIR OWN EFFORTS
A. Nature of the Claims
There are several arguments that proponents of the Golan
view could raise in support of the idea that distributors’ interests
are part of copyright’s legitimate goal––or at least, in support of
the idea that the disseminators’ interest need some form of
protection against copying.229 For instance, entirely apart from
the publishers’ investments in creators (such as paying the large
advances commanded by successful authors), publishers could be
said to invest in typesetting and typography; in the
infrastructure of advertisement and distribution; or in the
machinery of choice and the making of reputations.230
B. Why the Claims Fail
1. Typesetting, the Need to Pay Stars, and Other General
Claims by Disseminators. Most of these claims run into
difficulties fairly quickly. For instance, in the days of the
Framers, typesetting was a labor-intensive and time-consuming
process, and the lack of photocopy machines made it impossible
to free ride on typesetting: any duplicator would have to put in
the same amount of effort and set his own type.231 So preventing
physical free riding on set-up costs couldn’t have been part of the
Framers’ goal.232
227.
See 17 U.S.C. § 106(3).
228.
See id.
229.
Please see the rest of the Article for said arguments. See infra Part VI.B.
230.
Barnett, supra note 91, at 390 (explaining how copyright can be conceived as a
way to incentivize investments).
231. Interestingly, typefaces, though artistic in their genesis, are excluded from the
sphere of copyright. The CTEA does not extend copyright protection to typefaces. In its report,
the House Judiciary Committee explicitly stated that it “[had] considered, but chosen to defer,
the possibility of protecting the design of typefaces.” H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 55 (1976).
232.
Now manuscripts can be easily scanned and transformed into OCR digital form,
often using industry- and world-wide standard typefaces. That means that both original
publishers and purported free riders can succeed while investing little or nothing toward
typesetting or typography, and “piracy” need lead to no great cost-saving on typesetting.
See Chris Soghoian, TV Torrents: When ‘Piracy’ Is Easier Than Legal Purchase, CNET
(Sept. 12, 2007, 10:35 PM), http://www.cnet.com/news/tv-torrents-when-piracy-is-easierthan-legal-purchase/.
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As to investment in advertising or distribution
infrastructure, such costs accrue to any business with a wide
market. Proof is needed if we are to believe they apply in some
special way to film distributors and book publishers, and not to
electronics, athletic shoes, packaged foods, and even service
industries like airlines. It is difficult to see why publishers or
other distributors should be able to claim special protections—in
effect, special subsidies—for these common costs of doing
business.
Other arguments, such as pleas to expand IP rights based on
the high premiums and advances that distributors pay to “star”
creators (which constitute an expensive form of overhead for
these distributors), are not truly arguments in favor of special
solicitude for distributors.233 Rather, like traditional copyright
justifications, they turn on rewarding or incentivizing a creator.
The only difference is that instead of the public directly paying
the artist a high price for her work, the public pays the
distributor, and the distributor in turn pays the artist for the
right to exact that high price from the public.234 Thus, the crux of
any copyright justification is the claim of the artist, whose
economic argument in turn is a purported need to incentivize
creative activity.
2. Evaluative Skills, Cherry-Picking, and the Price System.
The pro-Golan argument that holds the most water is, perhaps,
that publishers make a major contribution by evaluating and
choosing which works to publish. Over time, the choices of
successful publishers might also give rise to a reputation or
brand image, upon which consumers come to rely. It is also
argued that if a publisher publishes ten books, and only one of
them is a hit, the publisher can use the profits from that one to
subsidize the other nine, thus potentially increasing the overall
choice available to the public and increasing the chances that the
next, latent bestseller will get the exposure it needs to take off.
Therefore, the publisher might argue, if its profits are leeched by
cherry-picking competitors who are able to copy and publish only
the bestsellers, its business model would be destroyed.235
This argument has been foundational to some views of
copyright that give a central role to publishers and other
disseminators and intermediaries. For example, Jonathan

233.
Barnett, supra note 91, at 400–05.
234.
See id. at 400–02.
235.
See id. at 391–92 (arguing that the cherry pickers are free riders who harm the
dominant intermediaries).
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Barnett recognizes that digitization makes reproduction and
dissemination easy,236 and that “popular views”237 tend to see
copyright (and publishers) as less important as a result. In the
face of that digital challenge, Barnett emphasizes the evaluative
role that some disseminators play as sponsors of content they
find worthwhile:238
In a digital environment, consumers’ screening and
evaluation burden rises given the abundance of content,
which increases . . . . Search and evaluation costs required
to filter out low-value output would be infeasible for any
individual user to bear. . . . [L]ower entry costs for artists
imply higher search and evaluation costs for
users. . . . Users’ increased cognitive burden in digitized
content markets preserves and even expands the screening
and persuasion function of cultural intermediaries. A
236.
Barnett writes,
It might be argued that the intermediary-based account only provides a
historical account of the role played by copyright in a “pre-digital” period during
which time it was costly to acquire the skills and equipment required to produce
and distribute content on a mass scale. By implication, the intermediary-based
case for copyright would appear to falter in an environment in which those costs
have fallen and artists can often reach end-users without an intermediary.
Id. at 392.
One of Barnett’s responses is to point to the role intermediaries can play in
evaluating and screening content, a role which he argues valuably reduces “consumers’”
search costs. This view I discuss in text.
Barnett’s other primary defense for intermediaries’ importance in a digital age
is the following:
[T]he decline of copyright in digitized content markets . . . has resulted in . . .[a]
shift[] from . . . intermediaries that specialize in the stand-alone delivery of
priced content to intermediaries that specialize in the delivery of unpriced
content that is bundled with a complementary asset—principally, hardware and
advertising or other services . . . . That shift . . . imposes a potential social
welfare loss . . . . Under strong copyright, all forms of intermediation—both
bundled and unbundled—are available . . . ; by contrast, under weak or zero
copyright, the set of intermediation options is limited to bundled mechanisms,
which may not coincide with the most efficient mechanisms for the mass
production and delivery of creative content.
Id.
This empirical claim strikes me as weak on its own, and also remarkably onesided in its failure to notice that strong copyright might limit institutional alternatives
just as weak copyright might. (In other words, it is wrong to assume that “all forms of
intermediation” will be available in the presence of strong copyright.) Therefore, the
empirical argument he makes would have to include not merely assessing the benefits of
options made possible by strong copyright, but would also have to include the opportunity
costs of losing the options such a legal environment would foreclose.
See the discussion of comparative institutional arrangements infra Part VIII.
Obviously, evaluating the empirics of Barnett’s argument lies outside the scope of my
current article.
237.
Barnett, supra note 91, at 392.
238.
Id. at 405–06 (explaining that authors will transfer most interests to
disseminators who are best positioned to finance the projects).
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sponsoring intermediary enjoys economies of scale and
learning in filtering the undifferentiated mass of creative
content. As such, it efficiently relieves the informational
burden borne by uninformed consumers and therefore
relieves the marketing burden borne by the unknown artist
or even the known artist with respect to any new creative
good. Far from being obsolete, the intermediary retains a
critical function in digital content markets.239

Barnett’s claims largely ignore the host of word-of-mouth,
volunteer, and ad-based sources of evaluation, which abound in
daily life and on the web. Even a commercial “favorites” site like
“Pinterest” does not seem to base its business models on
exclusion rights.240
Barnett’s position is also questionable in that it implies a
distrust of “regular folks” as effective intermediaries; the very
language he uses, “consumers,” ignores that many audiences are
both cultural participants, avid sharers of opinion, and possessors of
active minds. Concomitant with ignoring or understating the value
of “consumer” evaluations, Barnett is silent about the possible
inefficiencies and distortions generated by the “capital-intensive
marketing infrastructure” that he admires.
Moreover, arguments for using expanded copyright law to
help intermediaries241 “screen” material for audiences rests on a
number of factual and normative errors. The most obvious is
Barnett’s apparent assumption that choice is always a cost to
consumers rather than a pleasurable and educative exercise. To
the contrary, in my experience at least, many people are drawn
to the Internet because of the opportunities it offers to find and
share hidden sources of excellence.
A strict adherence to consumer sovereignty (that is, treating
preferences as “given”) would not ignore the benefits arising from
239.
Id. at 396, 419 (footnote omitted). Note that Barnett does not explicitly claim
that copyright “is intended to” benefit publishers or other intermediaries.
240.
Benjamin Spiegel, Pinterest: The Social Search Goldmine, MARKETING LAND
(Nov. 19, 2014, 9:38 AM), http://marketingland.com/pinterest-social-search-goldmine107925.
241.
Barnett writes of the copyright-expanding effects of his arguments:
An intermediary-based view suggests that the expansion of the subject
matter, term, assignability, divisibility and scope of copyright entitlements—
developments that have been subject to repeated criticism from the legal
academy—enhance intermediaries’ incentives to invest in creative works that
are costly and risky to identify, evaluate, produce, edit, market and distribute on
a mass scale.
Barnett, supra note 91, at 391.
That a disseminator focus would lead to copyright expansion is an opinion
Barnett and I share. Where we differ is on the question of whether or not this is a good
thing.
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choice and sharing that many people claim to enjoy. And more
flexible views of value—for example, value judgments based not
on expressed preference but on a notion of human flourishing—
would be even less likely to ignore the benefits of making an
individual making her own choices. Barnett’s perspective seems
to assume that effort is always costly and to be avoided. To the
contrary, the exercise of taste and judgment almost always has
intrinsic benefits.
What Barnett calls “increased cognitive burden” many of us
would call “fun.”
Finally, the argument based on publisher-as-evaluator fails
when it is used to argue that copyright should be altered to give
intermediaries strengths not given to other industries.
Evaluation of opportunities is what every business does and what
every business shares with others, willingly or not, through price
signals.
VII. SOME COPYING IS ESSENTIAL TO ALL COMPETITION
Barnett seems to emphasize the publishers’ abilities to
identify desirable works as a reason for anticopying rules.242 Such
an emphasis disregards the fact that signaling competitors about
one’s success is an inevitable and essential part of a
decentralized market system’s ability to allocate resources.
Ordinarily, this function is carried out by pricing. High prices
call attention to a need for more supply. The genius of the market
system supposedly lies in the way that decentralized actors can
share each other’s information via price signals.243
If there is a shortage of salt in a given community, then the
price of salt will rise and additional suppliers, both local and outof-state, will be motivated to enter the market, increasing the
supply and lowering the price. The new market entrants are
“copying” earlier salt-sellers’ good judgment about location and
product. The rising price signaled them to imitate.
A place on the bestseller list is a similar signal of high
demand. It tells competitors that there is a spot in the market
that they should move in to exploit. Of course, copyright law
impedes other publishers’ ability to compete in this way, just as
(in the old royalist days) a royal monopoly on the market for salt
would impede productivity in that sphere. Copyright must be
242.
See id. at 404–05 (explaining publishers may also need these rules since they
bear the risk that the creation will be a failure).
243.
For a classic explanation of the pricing system, see generally ARMEN A. ALCHIAN
& WILLIAM R. ALLEN, EXCHANGE AND PRODUCTION THEORY IN USE (1964) (discussing how
price signals the supply and demand of the good in question).
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sparingly used, particularly if, as Barnett suggests, the notion is
to use monopoly to preclude people acting on the signals of
desirable products upon which competition rests.244
The more a law mutes the power of signals to induce
imitation, the less ably will markets serve the economy.
VIII. OTHER OBJECTIONS AND ISSUES
Granted, in any market it might be advisable for there to be
some lead time where the first seller can be the only seller, to
allow innovators and first movers to recoup their extra
expenditures.245 However, this is potentially true of everything
from hybrid cars to cough medicine, as was emphasized by
Justice Breyer’s dissent in Golan.246 The burden is still on the
publishers to show, for example, why they cannot function with
only the exclusivity that is natural to the market (that is, the
time it takes for competitors to accurately identify what looks
like a success, duplicate it, and persuade customers to accept
their version as an adequate substitute for the original).247
244.
Barnett, supra note 91, at 424–25.
245.
See generally J.H. Reichman, Legal Hybrids Between the Patent and Copyright
Paradigms, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 2432, 2439 & n.25 (1994).
Lead time is the gap in time between when an initial distributor puts its
product on the market and the first date thereafter that a competitor can put out a
duplicate. Lead time may be a natural consequence of the market, as when a software
producer “has an advantage in developing derivative software to the extent that it
understands its own technology . . . [while] a competitor . . . would need to reverseengineer and spend time learning the technology before developing it.” Brett Frischmann
& Dan Moylan, The Evolving Common Law Doctrine of Copyright Misuse: A Unified
Theory and Its Application to Software, 15 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 865, 916 (2000). Lead
time may also be the result of legal mechanisms, as in the case of copyright, which
“extends natural lead-time effects during the statutory term of protection by giving
authors exclusive rights to produce derivative works.” Id. Whether and how much lead
time is advisable in a given context is a difficult empirical question; the answer is unlikely
to be the ninety-five or so years that copyright provides.
246.
Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873, 909–10 (2012) (Breyer, J., dissenting); see also
Stephen Breyer, The Uneasy Case for Copyright: A Study of Copyright in Books,
Photocopies, and Computer Programs, 84 HARV. L. REV. 281, 299–301 (1970) (discussing
the concept of lead time).
247.
In fact, Barnett himself points out that the popularity of hits declines quickly:
few become “‘classics’ for which demand persists beyond a single season.” Barnett, supra
note 91, at 408 (footnote omitted). If publishers are subsidizing less successful works with
the profits from a big hit—a questionable empirical proposition––and those big hits
usually only remain popular for one season, then a few months or a year of exclusive
protection should be sufficient to maintain their business model––hardly the author’s life
and seventy years beyond.
Moreover, copyright gives power and not merely money; and copyright extends
the copyright owner’s power not only against exact duplicators but against all sorts of
derivative and subsidiary products. Even if an argument can be made for granting
distributors some kind of help, that argument would not demonstrate that copyright’s
sweeping scope of exclusions is the proper vehicle.

Do Not Delete

2014]

11/30/2014 3:21 PM

THE CORE OF COPYRIGHT

673

Barnett also contends that the nonauthorial contributions of
distributors “are far more capital-intensive than the initial act of
creation, demand skills, equipment and infrastructure that are
not always easily accessible and are undertaken by [profitmotivated] entities.”248 Even if true, it is not clear what the claim
proves. All industries spend more than individuals do.
If an author spends five years writing a novel and living in
his parents’ attic (I’m thinking here of novelist Steven
Millhauser), his monetary investment is the opportunity cost of
five years’ lost wages plus the monetary “value” he would place
on avoiding the discomfort suffered; perhaps the lost wages and
the compensation for discomfort totals $500,000. Undoubtedly a
corporation can spend more than $500,000 on a project. That
says nothing about which entity—author or company—has more
need of the law’s aid.
A. Can Fair Use Extend to Noncreative Dissemination?
The reader may be wondering, if one holds that (1) Congress
cannot give copyright extensions/restorations that solely further
noncreative dissemination, does that position commit the holder
to also believing that (2) Congress cannot limit copyright in order
to encourage noncreative dissemination? The challenge could
run, if only authorial interests matter, isn’t it inconsistent to
support giving “fair use” to noncreative copying? The challenge is
apt, for I am here championing authorship as the core of
copyright, yet my articles since 1982 have argued that fair use
should extend to rote and uncreative copying such as in-home
taping of television programs for purposes of time-shifting, or
photocopying textual material for research and class use.249
I think my two positions are consistent. That is, one can hold
position (1), that noncreative dissemination cannot be
legitimately used as a goal to expand copyright, and consistently
hold position (1A), that noncreative dissemination can be
legitimately used as a goal to restrict copyright. The steps of the
argument are simple.
That creativity is uniquely important to the constitutional
clause does not cast doubt on the importance of noncreative use
for social policy and human welfare. Furthering noncreative use
248.
Id. at 395.
249.
See generally Gordon, supra note 147, where I argued that the Ninth Circuit in
the Betamax case was incorrect to limit fair use only to creative adaptations. On appeal,
in Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., the Supreme Court held that fair
use could embrace noncreative copies. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc.,
464 U.S. 417, 456 (1984).
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is one of many goals that Congress has some power to
further . . . but not in the Copyright Clause.
The structure of the U.S. Constitution Article I, Section 8,
Clause 8, is one sided. Congress has power to give exclusive
rights solely to encourage writers and inventors,250 but has no
duty to do so. Congress is not obliged to use this power. Any
consideration—including the value of creative or noncreative
activity that would be induced by limiting a copyright owner’s
exclusive rights251—is therefore legitimate for Congress to take
into account in deciding not to use its discretionary powers to
create copyrights.
So, to take a fanciful example: if every new song caused a
rash and every new novel induced psoriasis, Congress could
legitimately decide to stop awarding copyrights in songs and
books in the hope of thus protecting public health. The legitimacy
of that decision wouldn’t rest on whether the goal of protecting
the public epidermis lay within the Copyright Clause.252
The case for the legitimacy of taking the public’s
dissemination interests into account when limiting copyright is
even stronger than an argument for taking public health into
account. That is because the Clause authorizes grants of rights
for only “limited Times,” an acknowledgement and command by
the Framers that regard must be paid to the public’s interest in
access to creative works.253 Such regard is to be paid not in terms
of copyright expansion but in terms of copyright limits—the
Clause tells us so, for it states that copyrights must end.254
B. Line-Drawing
If the key to copyright is the creation of beneficial works of
authorship, it might be asked, why should a right of suit not
inhere in people who make other beneficial societal contributions
250.
See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (“Congress shall have Power . . . [t]o promote the
Progress of Science . . . by securing [to Authors] for limited Times . . . the exclusive Right
to their . . . Writings” (emphasis added)).
251.
In fact, one reason for the “limited Time” restraint on congressional power is
precisely to further dissemination. This is further discussed in Part VIII.B.
252.
See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. Confusion probably results from the fact that
(unlike the furthering of healthy skin) furthering noncreative dissemination obviously can
further the same goal as copyright does, namely, the furtherance of Progress in
knowledge. But the Copyright Clause doesn’t enable Congress to grant any rights it wants
to in order to further Progress.
253.
I first heard a variant of this point––that the Clause’s reference to “limited
Times” itself indicates that Congress must take into account public interest as well as
author/inventor interest—made by James Boyd White.
I am in his debt.
254.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
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with high, one-time, up-front costs? Does my position commit me
to a supporting a “misappropriation explosion” or a giant uptick
in the scope of restitution?
The short answer is that the Framers chose a unique and
limited set of benefit-generators, people who used their minds
and artistry. Perhaps the Constitution should be amended to
empower Congress to give rights against imitation for the
purpose of incentivizing all sorts of new categories of effort; or
perhaps states should expand restitution, and copyright
preemption should squeeze itself out of the way of state law
developments.255 Those matters are separate from the issue of
whether incentives for creativity play a unique role in copyright
itself.256 The “limited Times” provision gives us, I think, a
positive answer to that latter issue. And the focus I urge on
creativity—the plea that courts not justify copyright expansion
with reference to noncreative dissemination—is one way to
constrain a potentially explosive restitutionary logic.
Any incentive rationale has dangers. Giving all volunteers who
generate benefits a prima facie right to sue, even if limited to
volunteers whose initial efforts involve “nonrepeatable costs,”257
might, inter alia, inhibit the formation of contracts, cause
individuals significant harm by forcing them to pay for things they
would not buy, and scotch beneficial voluntary gift exchange.258 And
for nonauthorial benefit-creators, a right to sue might not bring
society the contributions to free discussion, self-development, and
democratic exchange that copyright (we hope) might bring.
I have suggested elsewhere that copyright is a good
exception to the rule in restitution doctrine that volunteers
255.
Incentivizing all sorts of efforts is of course already a big part of other aspects of
American law, whether state law (e.g., property law), federal law (e.g., anti-discrimination
law), and constitutional law (e.g., the role that the Takings Clause plays in keeping
incentives active and avoiding a “demoralization” that would reduce productivity). See
Frank Michelman, Property, Utility and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations
of “Just Compensation” Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165, 1214 (1967).
256.
Further, as I have argued,
Courts considering claims over intellectual products sometimes write as if
“reaping and sowing” and “unjust enrichment” automatically give rise to
absolute claims, trumping all other considerations. Yet the judicial experience in
the allied area of restitution has suggested that economic and other norms
should, and do, condition the implementation of the impulse to grant reward for
labor expended.
Gordon, On Owning Information, supra note 12, at 281 (emphasis added).
257.
Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873, 900 (2012) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
258.
See, e.g., Saul Levmore, Explaining Restitution, 71 VA. L. REV. 65, 102–04
(1985). The empirical validity of such arguments is as controversial as their normative
aspect. See, for example, Paul Starr’s criticism of the classic study by Titmuss, The Gift
Relationship. See DOUGLAS STARR, BLOOD 226–30 (1998) (criticism of the classic study by
Titmuss, The Gift Relationship).
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cannot sue beneficiaries for contribution.259 But that argument
depends, inter alia, on authorial creativity being the source of
benefit.
It is possible that a slippery slope problem is arising. Many
of us have observed a growing tendency for courts to penalize
“free riding,” even though the reciprocal use of benefits that
neighbors generate for each other is the essence of community.260
That tendency to condemn free riding (especially when the
benefit is reaped at no cost to the originator) is to be regretted.261
One way to help turn the misappropriation tide might be to
encourage the Justices next time to turn away from Eldred and
Golan, and keep their eyes on creativity as the object of copyright
incentive.
IX. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court erred in singling out the interests of
noncreative disseminators as being capable of providing
legitimacy to controversial extensions of the copyright statute.
Such an error will be less likely in the future if we see why the
Court might have been tempted by it: copyright economic theory
puts emphasis on dissemination;262 disseminators have long
profited from copyright and have long been involved in lobbying
for copyright;263 and several doctrines seem to put emphasis on
publication.264 But once these phenomena are examined, it
becomes clear that they do not support the Court’s recent
interpretation.
For example, this Article offers a distinctive view of the role
that “publication” played prior to 1978 in partly dividing federal
law from states’ “common law copyright”; the Article shows that
259.
See, e.g., Gordon, Of Harms and Benefits, supra note 13, at 563–64 (“The
varying fact patterns of different ‘volunteer’ cases may make it difficult for a court to
generalize to classes of activities or to make predictions about categories of behavior.”);
Gordon, On Owning Information, supra note 12, at 232–35 (“In the volunteer context, that
party is the benefactor, at least where mistake and other exceptional situations are
absent.”); see also Levmore, supra note 258, at 121 (denying restitution to volunteers
stems from “the freedom from liability enjoyed by those who decline to volunteer”).
260.
Lemley, supra note 31, at 1033.
261.
SHELLY KAGAN, THE GEOMETRY OF DESERT 46–117 (2012) (offering some useful
ways of illustrating, through graphs, various preferences for the distribution of resources).
For example, some persons strongly disapprove of anyone receiving an “undeserved
windfall” even when the windfall is costless to everyone.
262.
Cf. Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 889 (“A well-functioning international copyright system
would likely encourage the dissemination of existing and future works.”).
263.
See, e.g., Disney Lobbying for Copyright Extension No Mickey Mouse Effort,
supra note 39, § 1, at 22.
264.
See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 129–34 (1976) (showing common law
copyright as one example).
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the reason for ending common law copyright at “publication” had
nothing to do with a goal of fostering publication per se. The
Article also argues that the copyright owner’s exclusive right to
control distribution, section 106(3), is in the statute not to “serve
distributors,” but rather as a way to simplify the rules of liability
to aid authors’ attempts at enforcement.
In my view, it is proper to use copyright to further the
interests of disseminators to the extent this also has significant
potential for furthering creative activity. It is, however, improper
to use the interests of noncreative disseminators to legitimate
provisions that have no plausible effect on incentivizing new
creative work.
Challenges could be raised to my position. Some challenges
have been discussed in this Article. Other challenges exist as
well. For example, if only such dissemination as serves authorial
interests is relevant, that might invalidate some seemingly
sensible statutory rules—like the one that promotes public access
to ancient, unpublished works by giving their copyright owners
an extended copyright term if they publish by a certain date.265
My position might indeed mean that those attractive rules are
unconstitutional; however, that unfortunate possibility is grist
for another day’s milling.
The U.S. Constitution speaks not only of a goal—Progress—
but also of a means: grants of exclusive rights to authors and
inventors.266 The burden of persuasion rests on those who would
dislodge copyright from its explicit and traditional focus.
Our nation’s first copyright statute, in 1790, empowered
plaintiffs to destroy the texts printed by infringers.267 Today
injunctions and many other remedies fill out a copyright
plaintiff’s quiver with additional potential tools for “book
burning.”268 Whether authors should have such powers to
constrain speech is questioned by many scholars, even at the
265.
When Congress drew all unpublished and “fixed” works under the federal
mantle, the new statute encouraged the publication of long-unpublished manuscripts,
songs, and other art works by promising an extra term of years if they were published
promptly:
Copyright in a work created before January 1, 1978, but not theretofore in the
public domain or copyrighted, subsists from January 1, 1978, and endures for
the term provided by section 302. In no case, however, shall the term of
copyright in such a work expire before December 31, 2002; and, if the work is
published on or before December 31, 2002, the term of copyright shall not expire
before December 31, 2027.
17 U.S.C. § 303(a) (2012).
266.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
267.
Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, 1 Stat. 124, 124.
268.
See 17 U.S.C. §§ 501–505 (providing remedies for infringement).
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foundational level of Lockean theory.269 A fortiori, I doubt that
the Framers meant to give authors such extreme rights for the
purpose of serving publisher interests; it’s a poor fit. Publishers
and film restorers, standing alone, might need and deserve some
kind of assistance or subsidy. Many industries do. Copyright is
not the appropriate instrument for providing that assistance.
Copyright imposes a duty not to copy. One route to evaluate
how copyright law should evolve is to build conceptually on
common law foundations. To use the common law, however, there
must be an initial act to start the “duty” rolling. This Article has
argued that for the tort of copyright infringement, the initial act
is the author’s creation of a work. That argument has potential
consequences for building a new model for copyright statutes and
for judging the constitutionality of those enacted.

269.
See, e.g., Shiffrin, supra note 6, at 141. The legal literature on copyright/First
Amendment intersection is legion. See, e.g., Melville B. Nimmer, Does Copyright Abridge
the First Amendment Guarantees of Free Speech and Press?, 17 UCLA L. REV. 1180
(1970); see also Netanel, supra note 77.

